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 MACNIVEN V. WESTMORELAND AND TAX 
ADVICE: 
USING “PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM” TO 
DEAL WITH TAX SHELTERS AND PROMOTE 
LEGITIMATE TAX ADVICE 
SCOTT A. SCHUMACHER

 
The last few years have seen a flurry of activity aimed at the tax shelter industry.  Beginning 
with the “covered opinion” rules of Treasury Circular 230 in 2005, the government has adopted 
several changes to the standards applicable to tax advice, all in an effort to stop abusive tax shelters.  
Recently, both Congress (in 2007) and the Treasury (in 2008) have revised the standards applicable 
to tax advice to require that a position have a “more likely than not” chance of succeeding on the 
merits, or the position must be disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). While the 
government’s desire for reform is understandable, these changes will not stop abusive shelters and 
will make giving legitimate tax advice more difficult.  Moreover, these changes will also not succeed 
in what should be their ultimate goal—providing guidance for distinguishing between legitimate tax 
planning and abusive tax avoidance. 
My thesis in this Article is that whatever rules Congress, the Treasury, and the courts employ, 
these rules should be designed to encourage tax advice and to encourage that the advice given is 
proper. Our tax system is based on voluntary compliance, which requires a well-informed and well-
advised citizenry.  The recent amendments will, I fear, stifle tax advice, including legitimate advice.  
By the same token, the overly aggressive prior standard for tax advice of “realistic possibility of 
success” encouraged hyper-textualism and led too many advisors and their clients to review a 
position on a “can I get away with this” analysis, rather than honestly attempting to comply with the 
law. 
The standard that I propose is what I refer to as “purposive textualism” and is taken from the 
British House of Lords’ opinion by Lord Hoffmann in MacNiven v. Westmoreland.  Under the 
MacNiven analysis, one must analyze the “constructive purpose” of the tax statute and then 
determine whether the relevant provision of the statute, upon its true construction, applies to the 
facts at issue. While the House of Lords referred to this standard as “purposive construction,” the 
standard is more akin to the modern textualism that looks at the purpose of the statute in the context 
that Congress (or Parliament) enacted it.  In my view, the MacNiven formulation gives us the most 
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principled basis for determining what is an abusive tax shelter and what is legitimate tax planning.  
It is also a workable construction for tax advisors.  It is my hope that a discussion of the MacNiven 
opinion will offer a different perspective on the issue of tax shelters and tax advice and bring a fresh 
debate to these issues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The last few years have seen a flurry of activity aimed at the tax shelter 
industry.
1
  Beginning with the ―covered opinion‖ rules of Treasury Circular 
 
1. This flurry of activity has, of course, included numerous articles by tax scholars.  See, e.g., 
Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1939 (2005); Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax 
Shelters, 24 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2004); Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax Shelter Regulation, 
26 VA. TAX REV. 357 (2006); Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, 
Possible Solutions, and a Reply To Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325 (2002).  It is therefore 
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230,
2
 the government has adopted several changes to the standards applicable 
to tax advice, all in an effort to stop abusive tax shelters.  Recently, both 
Congress (in 2007) and the Treasury (in 2008)
3
 revised the standards 
applicable to tax advice to require that the position have a ―more likely than 
not‖ chance of succeeding on the merits, or the position must be disclosed to 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
4
 
While the government‘s desire for reform is understandable, these 
changes will not stop abusive shelters and will make the giving of legitimate 
tax advice more difficult.
5
  More importantly, these changes will not succeed 
in what should be their ultimate goal—providing guidance for distinguishing 
between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance.
6
  Indeed, what 
often gets lost in the discussion of tax shelters is the fact that the vast majority 
of taxpayers are trying to comply with the law and that their advisors are 
doing their best to inform their clients about what the law provides.  
Moreover, the new anti-shelter initiatives rely primarily upon disclosure and 
penalties to root out abusive schemes.
7
  But, as others have noted, disclosure 
is not the solution.
8
 
In addition, recent court decisions are unlikely to be helpful in providing 
guidance to advisors and helping them determine whether a position is ―more 
likely than not‖ to be successful.  While the economic substance and business 
purpose doctrines, at least in their current iterations, may generally provide 
 
with more than mild trepidation that I wade into this area with yet another article on tax shelters. 
2. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2007). 
3. Many of the administrative actions in this area have been taken by the Treasury Department, 
the Internal Revenue Service, or both.  For simplicity‘s sake, I will refer to the Treasury Department 
and the IRS collectively as the Treasury. 
4. These recent legislative and administrative activities elevated the standard for return advice 
to more likely than not.  See, e.g., U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans‘ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq 
Accountability Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8246(b)(2)(B), 121 Stat. 200 (2007).  If the 
advisor cannot reach this relatively high standard, the position must be disclosed. 
5. Randolph E. Paul warned of this problem in 1937 when he advised: ―Care should also be 
used in the selection of measures to prevent avoidance which will not bear down unduly upon those 
who are not avoiding taxes.  Taxing statutes are usually, and perhaps must always for constitutional 
reasons be, put in general terms, and the effect of some measures directed at tax-avoidance 
mechanisms is often . . . to cause, ‗like Herod‘s massacre,‘ great suffering without reaching the 
particular cases which inspired it.‖  RANDOLPH E. PAUL, STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION: 
TAXATION WITHOUT MISREPRESENTATION 65 (1937) (footnotes omitted). 
6. In making this statement, I reject the contention of Professor David Weisbach that all tax 
planning is necessarily abusive and creates nothing of value.  See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths 
About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222 (2002). 
7. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6011, 6694, 6707A (West 2007); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6707, 6708 (2000 & 
Supp. V 2005). 
8. See, e.g., Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1942; David M. Schizer, Enlisting the Tax 
Bar, 59 TAX L. REV. 331, 369, 370 (2006). 
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the correct result to the case at hand,
9
 they offer little constructive guidance to 
distinguish between tax planning and tax abuse.
10
  Indeed, while some 
transactions are invalidated because they lack economic substance apart from 
tax savings, many transactions that are entered into solely for tax purposes are 
acceptable under the tax laws.
11
  The economic substance and business 
purpose analyses used by courts offer little in the way of guidance for future 
cases. 
My thesis in this Article is that whatever rules Congress, the Treasury, and 
the courts employ, these rules should be designed to encourage tax advice and 
to encourage that the advice given is proper.  The system, whatever it is, must 
work with or at least co-opt tax professionals.  Given the low audit coverage, 
in order for the tax system to work with any modicum of efficiency, tax 
professionals must be encouraged to properly advise their clients on what the 
law is.
12
  The recent amendments do just the opposite. 
Ultimately, whether the analysis is being done by a tax attorney, the IRS, 
or a federal judge, the task should be to determine what the law is and what 
Congress intended.  The overly aggressive ―realistic possibility of success‖ 
and ―reasonable basis‖ standards for tax advice encouraged hyper-textualism 
and led too many advisors and their clients to review a position on a ―can I get 
away with this‖ analysis, rather than honestly attempting to comply with the 
law.  On the other hand, selectively imposing economic realism on the tax 
system, a system that is based in large part on legal and fiscal fictions, 
provides no guidance to taxpayers or their advisors and may indeed add to the 
cynicism surrounding the tax system.
13
 
 
9. However, the different treatment by various courts suggests that the analysis under these 
tests is more of an art form than a science. 
10. Every case seems to turn on the Potter Stewart pornography test of ―I know it when I see 
it.‖  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (not ―trying to define what 
may be indefinable . . . [b]ut I know it when I see it‖); see also ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d 
231, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting) (―I can‘t help but suspect that the majority‘s 
conclusion . . . is, in its essence, something akin to a ‗smell test.‘‖). 
11. See, e.g., tax-free reorganizations, 26 U.S.C. § 368 (2000); tax-free exchanges of property, 
26 U.S.C. § 1031 (2000 & Supp. V 2005); Subchapter Selections, 26 U.S.C.A. § 1362 (West 2007); 
Qualified Terminable Interest Property (QTIP) elections, 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (2000); the annual 
exclusion for gift tax purposes, 26 U.S.C. § 2503(b) (2000); just to name a few.  
12. See Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading 
Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 73 (2001). 
13. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has identified three ways in which the 
increase in shelter activity has adversely impacted the administration of the tax laws.  First, the 
limited audit resources of the IRS have been diverted to focus on tax shelters.  Second, the courts 
have been burdened by a substantial increase in the number of pending cases.  Third, the rise of the 
tax-shelter industry may have contributed significantly to the general deterioration in compliance by 
undermining taxpayer confidence in the fairness and effectiveness of the tax laws.  STAFF OF J. 
COMM. ON TAX‘N, 98TH CONG., PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS AND OTHER TAX-
MOTIVATED TRANSACTIONS 6 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX 
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The standard that I propose is what I will refer to as ―purposive 
textualism‖14 and is taken from the British House of Lords‘ opinion by Lord 
Hoffmann in MacNiven v. Westmoreland.
15
  Under this analysis, one must 
analyze the ―constructive purpose‖ of the tax statute and then determine 
whether the transaction at issue is consistent with that statutory purpose.  In 
my view, the MacNiven formulation gives us the most principled basis for 
determining what is an abusive tax shelter and what is legitimate tax planning.  
It is also a workable construction for tax advisors, which, if employed 
appropriately, should provide for legitimate tax advice to clients. 
Part II of this Article will deal with how we got to where we are, the rise 
of the mega-shelter industry, and how the realistic possibility of success 
standard and the economics of the system led to this problem.
16
  This part will 
trace the role of tax advisors in the tax system from the adoption of the 
income tax to the present.  What I hope to show is that the prior system 
encouraged aggressive tax positions across the board and led,
17
 at least in part, 
to the tax shelter wars we are mired in today.  While this antebellum regimen 
may have been appropriate at the time,
18
 it is no longer sustainable. 
Part III will look at the recent rules adopted and proposed by the 
government to deal with shelters.  While a whole host of provisions are in 
play here, I will focus on the new provisions that are emblematic of the efforts 
of Congress and the Treasury, namely the covered opinion rules of Circular 
230 and the revisions to the opinion standards by amended § 6694 of Title 26 
of the U.S. Code.  In this part, I will show why the current efforts are not an 
answer to the problem and will, in fact, create larger problems. 
Finally, in Part IV of the Article, I will discuss what the standard should 
be.  The House of Lords, in MacNiven, provides us with a method for 
 
SHELTERS]. 
14. As discussed more fully infra Part IV.B, there has, of course, been much written on the 
differences and similarities of the textualist and purposive approach to statutory interpretation.  See, 
e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 
(2006).  My use of the phrase ―purposive textualism‖ is not meant to diminish the distinction 
between these two schools.  Rather, it is a description of the methodology employed by the House of 
Lords in MacNiven and is designed to highlight the new paradigm in textualism as recognized by 
Professor Manning.  MacNiven v.Westmoreland, [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 29 (UKHC). 
15. MacNiven, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶¶ 19–75. 
16. It is only by examining the shelter problem in full (or at least, fullish) context that a suitable 
resolution can be found. 
17. And by ―prior system‖ I mean the rules and standards prior to 2005, when the covered 
opinion rules of the Department of Treasury § 10.35 of Circular No. 230 were adopted, which in my 
view altered the tax landscape for good.  31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2007).  One could certainly pick another 
date or event to demarcate the ―Tax BCE,‖ but this date seems as good as any. 
18. Some scholars have argued that the realistic possibility of success standard was misguided 
from its launch.  See, e.g., Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of 
ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 643, 643 (1986). 
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analyzing tax statutes, which in turn leads to a workable standard for tax 
advice.  While the House of Lords referred to this standard as ―purposive 
construction,‖ in my view the standard is more akin to the modern textualism 
that looks at the purpose of the statute in the context that Congress (or 
Parliament) enacted it.  While the issues and analysis employed by the Lord 
Justices in MacNiven have much in common with the opinions of some U.S. 
courts, it is nevertheless my hope that a review of that opinion will offer a 
different perspective on the issue of tax shelters and tax advice and bring a 
fresh debate to these issues.  I am not so naïve as to think that my new 
standard will be the answer to all of the ills that face tax practice or that it is a 
―silver bullet.‖19  However, like the introduction of the MacNiven decision 
into the tax shelter debate in the United States, I hope my analysis will move 
the debate in a salubrious direction. 
II.  HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
And you may ask yourself 
Am I right? . . . Am I wrong? 
And you may tell yourself 
MY GOD! . . . WHAT HAVE I DONE?
20
 
 
For most of the relatively brief history of the income tax, tax lawyers were 
given wide latitude to advise clients, with few standards governing advice, 
save the general standards of the ABA.
21
  When standards were eventually 
adopted by the government, the standards were comparatively lax.
22
  Those 
standards have recently been replaced by a more draconian regime.
23
  This 
part traces the history of tax compliance and tax lawyers‘ roles in that system. 
A.  Tax Avoidance and the Nature of the Tax Law 
Even prior to the enactment of the income tax in 1913, tax avoidance was 
an issue for the government, the courts, and lawyers. 
The people who used the tax on tea as the spark to ignite a revolution and 
who had included in their constitution a prohibition against any direct tax by 
 
19. See Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1951 (attempting to mold a ―silver bullet‖ to 
attack shelters). 
20. TALKING HEADS, Once in a Lifetime, on REMAIN IN LIGHT (Warner Bros. Records 1980). 
21. The original thirty-two Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted by the American Bar 
Association in 1908.  See Preface to MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY, at ix (1986). 
22. Treas. Dep‘t Cir. No. 230 § 10.22 (2007); 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(w) (1938) (requiring tax 
professionals to exercise ―due diligence‖ in preparing and advising on tax return positions); Treas. 
Dep‘t Cir. No. 230 § 10.34 (2007); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1994) (requiring a realistic chance of success 
on the merits, defined as a one-in-three chance of success). 
23. See infra Part III. 
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their federal government were not likely to discuss morality and taxes in the 
same breath.  The tax collector was an intruder, and if you could escape his 
clutches, you were in the same fortunate position as someone who had 
escaped smallpox or diphtheria.
24
 
In one of the first cases to address the issue of tax avoidance, the Supreme 
Court held that if the tax avoidance ―is carried out by the means of legal 
forms, it is subject to no legal censure.‖25  While this formalistic approach 
may have stemmed in part from the anti-tax history of the United States, it is 
also the result of the nature of the tax laws.
26
 
In constructing the right ethical model for tax advice, one must begin with 
the premise that tax planning and minimization are both inevitable and 
unavoidable.  I do not use these terms in a fatalistic sense that all men are evil 
and that there are insufficient resources to rid us of the scourge of tax 
avoidance.
27
  Rather, tax planning and minimization are unavoidable because 
the tax laws are necessarily an exercise in line drawing.
28
  As Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes stated, ―[W]hen the law draws a line, a case is on one side of 
it or the other, and if on the safe side is none the worse legally that a party has 
availed himself to the full of what the law permits.‖29  Thus, the line drawing 
that is inherent in tax law inevitably causes taxpayers and their advisors to 
plan their affairs to fall on one side of the law or the other.
30
 
This idea is developed by the oft-quoted statement regarding taxes, that of 
Judge Learned Hand: ―Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall 
be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best 
pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one‘s taxes.‖31  
As with Justice Holmes‘s averment, Judge Hand‘s statement is not a 
normative judgment, nor is it, as many shelter promoters and others have 
argued, ―a license to circumvent rules on the claim of assisting taxpayers in so 
 
24. See Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, 10 INST. ON FED. TAX‘N 1067, 1068 
(1952). 
25. United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. 496, 506 (1873). 
26. Norris Darrell, Responsibilities of the Lawyer in Tax Practice, reprinted in PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 87, 100 (Boris I. Bittker ed., 1970) (―It is for the 
government to determine what taxes should be paid and in what circumstances. . . . To infer that 
there is something morally wrong with avoiding tax in a legitimate way, there being no fraud, deceit 
or make-believe, is pure hypocrisy.‖). 
27. Much of the law surrounding this is based on Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes‘s bad man 
theory of law.  See Falk, supra note 18, at 648. 
28. See PAUL, supra note 5, at 19 (―As long as taxes are imposed, there will be transactions in 
which the tax will be greater one way than another way, or in which one way will be above the 
suspicion attaching to another way.‖). 
29. Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625, 630 (1916). 
30. See PAUL, supra note 5, at 101; Francis C. Oatway, Motivation and Responsibility in Tax 
Practice: The Need for Definition, 20 TAX L. REV. 237, 252 (1965). 
31. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934). 
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arranging their affairs.‖32  Rather, it is a statement regarding the nature of the 
tax laws.
33
  This must be fully understood in formulating an appropriate 
ethical standard for tax lawyers.  Tax minimization, or arranging one‘s affairs 
in such a way to comply with the tax laws, or however one wants to 
characterize it, is a necessary part of the tax lawyer‘s role.34  Policy makers 
must recognize the inevitability of tax advice and tax minimization in 
formulating appropriate standards so as to ensure both that tax advice is given 
and that the advice given is proper. 
In addition, unlike other areas of the law that arguably have a moral 
component to them, there is nothing inherently moral or immoral in the tax 
laws.
35
  As one commentator stated, 
 
If there are two bridges across a river, one a toll bridge and 
the other free, both leading to the same destination, there is 
no moral reason whatsoever why the traveler shouldn‘t 
choose the free one.  If the law permits a taxpayer to arrange 
to make a profit in such a way that it is taxable as capital gain 
and not as ordinary income, there is no moral reason 
whatsoever why he shouldn‘t do it.36 
 
Thus, the tax laws either permit a certain deduction or they do not.
37
 
There is no touchstone, apart from the law itself, requiring a taxpayer to 
pay a certain amount of tax.
38
  There is no absolute right amount of tax or a 
 
32. Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters: 
Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict Liability, 29 J. CORP. L. 219, 241 n.114 
(2004). 
33. Darrell, supra note 26. 
34. Randolph E. Paul, The Lawyer as a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 412, 415 (1953). 
35. One of the most famous quotes in this regard is from J.P. Morgan, who stated, ―Income tax 
evasion is a legal, not a moral question.  Anyone has a right to do anything the law does not say is 
wrong.‖  BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE, at xxxii (3d 
ed. 1995). 
36. Darrell, supra note 26, at 100. 
37. See, e.g., Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to His 
Client and to the Government—The Theory, 15 S. CAL. TAX INST. 25, 26 (1963) (―No taxpayer can 
be asked to pay a tax which he considers to be ‗fair‘ under some abstract code of morality.  An 
absolute requisite is a rule book—a written set of rules whose meaning is reasonably clear and 
explicit.‖). 
38. There is, of course, a question as to whether the law, simply because it is the law, must be 
followed.  As a result, the arbitrary provisions of the revenue laws are, and just as importantly are 
perceived as, quite distant from clear mandates such as ―thou shall not kill‖ or ―no parking vehicles 
in the park.‖  Thus, on a more theoretical or philosophical level is the question of whether we are 
bound to follow the law merely because it is the law.  See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1958).  This issue has been picked up by 
Professors Joseph Raz and John Finnis, among others, who have carried the debate forward.  John 
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pure amount of tax.  Certainly being straight and honest with the government 
should be required, but that only begs the question as to what constitutes 
being straight and honest with the government.
39
  Thus, despite Justice 
Holmes‘s aphorism, ―I like to pay taxes.  With them I buy civilization,‖40 not 
even the most pro-tax individual can decide what is the ―correct‖ amount of 
tax.  There is no correct amount of tax independent of what Congress has 
declared it to be.
41
 
B.  The Role of Tax Advisors in Tax Planning 
While tax law is inherently an exercise in line drawing, the line drawn by 
Congress has not always been crystalline.
42
  Given that taxpayers are required 
to pay only their ―fair share,‖ who decides what that amount is?  Professor 
 
Finnis, The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory, 1 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‘Y 115, 115–16 (1984); Joseph Raz, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and 
Tradition, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‘Y 139, 139, 140, 141 (1984).  Professor Raz‘s 
position is that there is no inherent justification for following the law merely because it is the law, 
and citizens are entitled to question the validity of even duly enacted laws.  Id. at 141.  While the vast 
majority of citizens have never heard of Professor Raz, let alone read his work, it appears that most 
Americans are rather Razian in their attitudes toward the tax code. 
39. See Tony Honoré, The Dependence of Morality on Law, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 
(1993). 
 
According to most people‘s moral outlook members of a community should 
make a contribution to the expense of meeting collective needs. . . . So members 
of a community have in principle a moral obligation to pay taxes. But this 
obligation is incomplete or, if one prefers inchoate, apart from law. It has no 
real content until the amount or rate of tax is fixed by an institutional decision, 
by law. What amounts to a reasonable contribution is not otherwise 
determinable, since what is required is a co-ordinated scheme which can be 
defended as fair not merely in the aggregate amount it raises but in its 
distribution. Taxpayers cannot settle it for themselves, as people can within 
limits settle for themselves, say, the proper way of showing respect for the 
feelings of others. Apart from law no one has a moral obligation to pay any 
particular amount of tax. An obligation to pay an indeterminate sum is not an 
effective obligation; it requires only a disposition, not an action. So, apart from 
law no one has an effective obligation to pay tax. 
Id. 
40. FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 42–43 (1938). 
41. Nor, practically, can one really pay more tax than is due.  Section 6402 of the Internal 
Revenue Code requires the government, subject to the limitations of § 6402, to refund any 
overpayment to the taxpayer. 26 U.S.C. § 6402 (2000); see also Jones v. Liberty Glass Co., 332 U.S. 
524, 531 (1947) (―[W]e read the word ‗overpayment‘ in its usual sense, as meaning any payment in 
excess of that which is properly due. . . . Whatever the reason, the payment of more than is rightfully 
due is what characterizes an overpayment.‖). 
42. Judge Learned Hand said about the income tax that the words that otherwise seem to 
―dance before [our] eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to cross-reference, exception 
upon exception—couched in abstract terms that offer no handle to seize hold of.‖  Learned Hand, 
Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947). 
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Judith Freedman cogently argues that obviously it should not be the taxpayer 
who makes this determination.
43
  Resolving these ambiguities is delegated, at 
least in the first instance, to tax advisors.  This highlights the fundamental role 
tax advisors play in the tax system.  Tax attorneys and accountants help 
clients navigate the murky waters of the tax code and help taxpayers 
understand what the law requires.
44
  Tax advisors also provide clients with 
creative solutions to limit their tax liabilities and with protection from 
accuracy related penalties if the tax plan does not work out as designed.  This 
ability to ―add value‖ has encouraged the more risk-tolerant and wealthy 
taxpayers to take positions that are not legitimate and to pay large fees for the 
advice. 
From the beginning of the income tax, there have always been those who 
will seek to pay as little as possible.  The battle cry of the American 
Revolution was not ―liberté, égalité, fraternité,‖ but rather, ―no taxation 
without representation.‖45  Public opinion polls have consistently shown a 
hostility toward taxes and the IRS.
46
  This disdain for income taxes cuts across 
ideological and political lines and reflects the public‘s dislike of government 
and the programs funded by the government.
47
  Thus, whether you are an anti-
war liberal or a pro-life conservative, you can find some reason not to want to 
 
43. Judith Freedman, Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-
Avoidance Principle, BRIT. TAX REV., July–Aug. 2004, at 332, 334 (―It is inevitable that there will 
be fundamental tensions between the essential need of governments to raise revenue and the lack of 
desire of taxpayers to pay for this.  Quite apart from differences about the size and role of the state, 
which are obviously to be decided in the ballot box in a democratic society, each taxpayer will 
consider that he should pay only his ‗fair share.‘  What is his fair share may be a matter for argument, 
but what is clear is that the taxpayer himself is ‗not the proper person to decide what it should be.‘‖ 
(footnote omitted)). 
44. Robert H. Jackson, Changes in Treasury Tax Policy, 12 TAXES 342, 343 (―In applying a 
technical law which few have read, and voluminous regulations known to fewer, and opinions and 
decisions some of which are not even published, errors will be made, differences of opinion will 
arise.‖). 
45. This is not to imply that tax shelters or the desire to pay less taxes is a uniquely American 
phenomenon. See, e.g., Donald L. Korb, Shelters, Schemes, and Abusive Transactions: Why Today’s 
Thoughtful U.S. Tax Advisors Should Tell Their Clients to “Just Say No ,” in J-736 TAX STRATEGIES 
FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, 
REORGANIZATIONS & RESTRUCTURINGS 409, 411–12 (Practising Law Institute 2006) (recounting tax 
dodges throughout history since the times of ancient Rome).  Moreover, my solution to the shelter 
problem is based in large part upon the House of Lords‘ decision in MacNiven v.Westmoreland, 
[2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311 (UKHC). 
46. See Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV. 
645, 692 nn.206–07 (2003). 
47. In two Fox News/Opinion Dynamics polls taken in 2002 and 2005, between seventy-one 
percent and seventy-five percent of respondents objected to how their tax dollars were spent, rather 
than the amount of taxes they paid.  The poll is available at http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2008). 
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fully fund the government.
48
  Another public sentiment is that while only 
fourteen percent have ever been even tempted to cheat on their own taxes, 
these same people believe that thirty-nine percent of their neighbors are 
cheating on their taxes.
49
  Thus, there is a belief that only a fool pays his full 
amount of tax, or as Leona Helmsley so eloquently stated, ―Only the little 
people pay taxes.‖50  And there is a belief that if we only find the right tax 
advisor, we will only be required to pay that which we are constitutionally 
obligated to forfeit.
51
 
The imposition of penalties and the role of tax attorneys in shielding 
clients from these penalties must be emphasized.  While it is true that tax 
lawyers are lawyers who happen to specialize in a given area (i.e., tax), tax 
lawyers‘ ability to insulate their clients from penalties, merely by giving them 
advice, is unusual in law.
52
  Thus, the normal generalizations and positive 
exhortations of the rules of professional conduct are insufficient for tax 
advice.  Tax lawyers hold the key to understanding the tax laws and to 
protecting clients from penalties, and financial incentives have usually caused 
lawyers to side with clients.  Whatever rules or standards are adopted must 
take into account the tax lawyer‘s unique role in the tax system. 
C.  Standards Applicable to Tax Advice 
Unlike many legal specialties, tax lawyers do not have a venerable 
tradition to compel adherence to fixed ethical rules.
53
  Indeed, in an article 
from 1953, Randolph Paul states that until that time, ―very few tax lawyers 
 
48. Freedman, supra note 43, at 337 (noting the same attitude in United Kingdom). 
49. Blum & Weprin/NBC poll, April 2005, available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/budget.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2008). 
50. The Associated Press, Maid Testifies Helmsley Denied Paying Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 
1989, at B2 (quoting Leona Helmsley). 
51. See Miller, supra note 24, at 1074 (―Most people think of us as having a bag of tricks that 
greatly reduces our clients‘ taxes and probably gets us out altogether on our own.‖). 
52. See, e.g., People v. Nat‘l Ass‘n of Realtors, 202 Cal. Rptr. 243, 248 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(rejecting defense to civil penalties of reliance on advice of counsel). 
53. Compare the archetypical duties of the zealous advocate, summarized by Lord Brougham in 
1821 in his defense of Queen Caroline: 
 
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the 
world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by all means and 
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and amongst them, to 
himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not 
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. 
JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE 342 
(2005) (citing Gerald F. Uelmen, Lord Brougham’s Bromide: Good Lawyers as Bad Citizens, 30 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 119, 120 (1996)).  The lawyer-as-zealous-advocate standard has played a 
significant role, perhaps too significant, in the formulation of standards of conduct relating to tax 
return advice. 
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[even gave] much thought to the ethics that should govern‖ the profession and 
that there was no clear set of guidelines governing how tax advice should be 
dispensed.
54
  Despite the fact that the Treasury had been given authority in 
1884 to promulgate rules of practice before it,
55
 the Treasury did little to 
dictate the rules applicable to tax professionals in rendering return advice.  
The original version of Circular 230 did not contain any standards for advice 
or preparations of returns;
56
 the first version of Circular 230 to include any 
standard regarding tax advice did not appear until 1938.
57
  Even then, the 
standard required practitioners only to ―exercise due diligence‖ in preparing 
or assisting in the preparation of returns and other documents.
58
  This standard 
appeared to require tax professionals to do some independent investigation but 
did not set forth any criteria regarding how ambiguities in the statute should 
be resolved.
59
  However, given the complexity of the tax laws and the broad 
application of these arcane statutes, disputes with the IRS as to how the Code 
should be interpreted were bound to occur.  And, given that penalties were 
imposed for failure to follow the dictates of the Code, the issue of the 
standards applicable to taxpayers and their advisors would inevitably come to 
the fore. 
Negligence penalties were first added to the Code in 1918.
60
  The penalty 
was a modest five percent of the total amount of the deficiency and applied 
where an understatement was ―due to negligence on the part of the taxpayer, 
but without intent to defraud,‖61 or there was an ―intentional disregard of 
authorized rules and regulations with knowledge thereof.‖62  However, if the 
return was ―made in good faith and the understatement of the amount in the 
return [wa]s not due to any fault of the taxpayer,‖ no penalty would be 
imposed because of the understatement.
63
 
 
54. Paul, supra note 34, at 412. 
55. 23 Stat. 258 (1884).  Indeed, it took more than 100 years for the Treasury to issue final 
regulations that provided any real standards governing the rendering of tax advice.  See 31 C.F.R. § 
10.34 (1994); T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (1994); 1994-2 C.B. 415. 
56. Circular 230 is the collection of rules governing practice before the Treasury.  Rev. Rul. 
230, 4-1600A C.B. 408 (1921). 
57. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(w) (1938). 
58. Id. 
59. See id. 
60. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 250(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1083.  For an excellent history of the 
negligence penalty and other tax penalties, see Donald Arthur Winslow, Tax Penalties—“They Shoot 
Dogs, Don’t They?,” 43 FLA. L. REV. 811, 821–54 (1991). 
61. Revenue Act of 1918 § 250(b). 
62. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 250(b), 42 Stat. 265. 
63. Id.; Revenue Act of 1918 § 250(b); see also Winslow, supra note 60, at 836–40. 
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When cases requiring application of these standards reached the courts, 
the resulting analyses, while conclusory,
64
 nevertheless were the foundation 
for the ―reasonable basis‖ and ―substantial authority‖ standards, and endorsed 
the efficacy of disclosure in eluding penalties.  For example, in Senner v. 
Commissioner,
65
 the Board of Tax Appeals held that the petitioner should not 
be held liable for negligence because the issues ―are questions concerning 
which petitioner had reasonable grounds to differ from the conclusions 
reached by the respondent.‖66  In Heffelfinger v. Commissioner,67 the Board 
refused to impose negligence penalties for intentional disregard of rules and 
regulations but without intent to defraud where the evidence showed that the 
petitioner ―honestly believed‖ that he had properly reported the income at 
issue and because an ―explanation was given of why the income was not 
reported by the petitioner.‖68  The Board reaffirmed the conclusions in these 
two cases in its decision in Davis Regulator Co. v. Commissioner
69
 and held 
that ―where full disclosure is made and the taxpayer has ‗reasonable grounds 
to differ from the conclusion‘ of the Commissioner that a tax is due, the 
negligence penalty should not be imposed.‖70  Finally, in Brockman Building 
Corp. v. Commissioner,
71
 the Tax Court held that the Commissioner erred in 
determining that the petitioner was liable for negligence penalties because the 
petitioner attached a rider to its return, the return was prepared by a certified 
public accountant, and the petitioner had a ―good faith,‖ ―bona fide‖ belief, all 
of which amounted to ―reasonable cause.‖72 
Thus, as originally formulated by the courts, insulation from penalties was 
based on the reasonableness of the taxpayer‘s actions,73 which could be 
demonstrated by, among other things, reliance on the advice of a professional 
and disclosure.
74
  The courts did not address the standards tax professionals 
must use in giving advice to clients, but it appears that underlying these 
 
64. The conclusory nature of this analysis persists to the current day.  See, e.g., Osteen v. 
Comm‘r, 62 F.3d 356, 358 (11th Cir. 1995) (chastising the Tax Court for its conclusory application 
of the substantial understatement and substantial authority provisions). 
65. 22 B.T.A. 655 (1931). 
66. Id. at 658. 
67. 32 B.T.A. 1232 (1935). 
68. Id. at 1235. 
69. 36 B.T.A. 437 (1937). 
70. Id. at 444 (citing Senner, 22 B.T.A. at 658; Heffelfinger, 32 B.T.A. at 1232). 
71. 21 T.C. 175 (1953). 
72. Id. at 191. 
73. As Professors Boris Bittker and Martin McMahon noted, ―[S]ince negligence is the 
antithesis of reasonable behavior, a showing of reasonable cause for the underpayment in effect 
negates the existence of negligence.‖  BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 45.3 (1988); see also Winslow, supra note 60, at 839. 
74. See Brockman Building Corp., 21 T.C. at 191. 
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standards was the assumption that taxpayers and their advisors were 
attempting to find the right answer, or at least had an honest dispute with the 
IRS as to how the law should be interpreted.
75
 
The first standards applicable to tax lawyers came not from the Treasury 
or the courts, but from the ABA.
76
  Formal Opinion 314 covers several 
matters, including whether the IRS is a tribunal,
77
 as well as what duties are 
owed to the IRS.
78
  Regarding the standards applicable to rendering tax advice 
to clients, the opinion provides that  
 
a lawyer who is asked to advise his client in the course of the 
preparation of the client‘s tax returns may freely urge the 
statement of positions most favorable to the client just as long 
as there is reasonable basis for those positions.  Thus where 
the lawyer believes there is a reasonable basis for a position 
that a particular transaction does not result in taxable income, 
or that certain expenditures are properly deductible as 
expenses, the lawyer has no duty to advise that riders be 
attached to the client‘s tax return explaining the 
circumstances surrounding the transaction or the 
expenditures.
79
 
 
Thus, the first standard applicable to attorneys giving tax return advice was 
the ―reasonable basis‖ test.80  If the lawyer believed that there was a 
reasonable basis for a return position, the lawyer could freely advise that 
position and was not required to advise the client to disclose that position.
81
 
Formal Opinion 314 was subject almost immediately to criticism.
82
  The 
reasonable basis standard was described by notable commentators as 
 
75. See id.; Heffelfinger v. Comm‘r, 32 B.T.A. 1232, 1234–35 (1935). 
76. See ABA Comm. on Prof‘l Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965). 
77. The ABA opined that the ―Internal Revenue Service is neither a true tribunal, nor even a 
quasi-judicial institution.‖  Id. 
78. Quoting various Canons of Ethics, Formal Opinion 314 provides that the lawyer may not 
mislead the IRS, conceal facts, or commit fraud, and ―should strive at all times to uphold the honor 
and to maintain the dignity of the profession.‖  Id. (quoting ABA CANONS OF PROF‘L ETHICS Canon 
29 (1967)). 
79. Id. 
80. See id. 
81. Id. 
82. See, e.g., Comm. on Tax Policy, Tax Section N.Y. State Bar Ass‘n, A Report on Complexity 
and the Income Tax, 27 TAX L. REV. 325, 330 (1972); Falk, supra note 18, at 644–45; James R. 
Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client that He May Take a Position on His Tax Return?, 29 
TAX LAW. 237, 244 (1976).  Formal Opinion 85-352 notes the ―persistent criticism by distinguished 
members of the tax bar, IRS officials and members of Congress.‖  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). 
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―anything you can articulate without laughing,‖83 or as any position that can 
be adopted ―with little more than a chuckle.‖84  More fundamentally, the 
reasonable basis standard appeared to allow attorneys to advise a position that 
they did not believe to be correct, as long as it was ―reasonable,‖ which might 
well be inconsistent with the taxpayer‘s statement in the jurat.85  Opinion 314 
also began with the premise that the IRS and tax lawyers are adversaries.  
―Accordingly, it viewed a tax return as a submission in an adversary 
proceeding and the lawyer‘s ethical obligations of candor and zeal as 
essentially those of an advocate.‖86 
The next development in the standards applicable to taxpayers and their 
advisors was the 1982 enactment of the substantial understatement penalty.
87
  
Under these new penalties, a taxpayer would be liable for a twenty-percent 
penalty if the understatement of tax was substantial.
88
  The amount of the 
understatement could be reduced if there was substantial authority for the 
treatment or if the item was adequately disclosed.
89
  Known as the ―audit 
lottery‖ penalty, the substantial understatement penalty was designed to 
―create downside risk for taxpayers who take aggressive, undisclosed 
positions.‖90  This development in the law regarding penalties called into 
question the reasonable basis standard of Formal Opinion 314.  Could a 
lawyer advise a client to take a position on a return that did not have 
substantial authority and advise the taxpayer not to disclose the position?  
Doing so would, in essence, allow a lawyer to advise a client to take a 
position that might subject the client to penalties. 
The Treasury‘s response was that a lawyer could not ethically advise such 
a position.
91
  In proposed regulations amending Circular 230, the Treasury 
 
83. Falk, supra note 18, at 644 (quoting Ethics Opinion 314 and Tax Shelters Addressed at 
ABA Meeting, 22 TAX NOTES 757 (1984)). 
84. James P. Holden, New Professional Standards in the Tax Market Place: Opinions 314, 346 
and Circular 230, 4 VA. TAX REV. 209, 235 (1985) (quoting Bernard Wolfman, Remarks During 
Panel Discussion on ABA Formal Op. 314 Made at ABA Section of Taxation 1984 Midyear Meeting 
(Feb. 11, 1984)). 
85. See Rowen, supra note 82, at 250. 
86. Falk, supra note 18, at 646. 
87. 26 U.S.C. § 6661 (1982) (repealed 1989). 
88. An understatement is substantial if it exceeds the greater of ten percent of the amount of tax 
shown on the return or $5,000.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
89. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
90. Falk, supra note 18, at 658 (citing Pascaner & Wolff, What Are the Professional’s 
Responsibilities Under the Substantial Understatement Rules?, 35 PRAC. ACCT. 392 (1985); John 
André LeDuc, The Legislative Response of the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, the Audit Lottery, and 
Other Forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX NOTES 363, 382–83 (1983)); 
Harvey M. Silets, TEFRA Penalties in Action, in 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-THIRD INSTITUTE 
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 9-1 (1985). 
91. 51 Fed. Reg. 29,113, 29,113–14 (Aug. 14, 1986). 
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made its first attempt to provide more guidance on the meaning of ―due 
diligence‖ and stated that a practitioner should not, in the exercise of due 
diligence, place his or her client in a position of being assessed any of the 
accuracy-related penalties.
92
  The proposed regulations were also premised on 
the Treasury‘s concern that the ethical standards of some practitioners 
regarding tax advice had eroded over the years.
93
  The Treasury believed this 
led to serious problems concerning taxpayer compliance with the revenue 
laws, which adversely affected the integrity of the voluntary, self-assessment 
tax system.
94
  The proposed regulations would have required a practitioner 
only to recommend positions that were ―supported by substantial authority‖; 
otherwise the relevant facts were required to be disclosed.
95
 
These proposed regulations were never adopted as final regulations.  After 
the substantial understatement penalties were enacted, and prior to the 
issuance of the proposed regulations, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics 
and Professional Responsibility adopted Formal Opinion 85-352, which 
became the standard for tax return advice for the next twenty years.
96
  In that 
opinion, the ABA abandoned the reasonable basis standard of Opinion 314 in 
an attempt to ―elevate the minimum ethical standard above that which 
‗reasonable basis‘ had come to represent for many practitioners and others.‖97  
The committee noted that the reasonable basis standard had been subjected to 
criticism by the tax bar, the IRS, and members of Congress, and as a result, 
the reasonable basis standard had been eroded as an ethical guideline.
98
  
Under Formal Opinion 85-352,  
 
 
92. Id. at 29,114. 
93. Id. at 29,113. 
94. Id. 
95. Id.  The proposed regulations would also have prohibited a practitioner from recommending 
or advising a client that a position be taken if the taxpayer would have been liable for the substantial 
understatement penalties.  Id. at 29,114. 
96. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).  Like all 
formal opinions issued by the ABA, Formal Opinion 85-352 was adopted by the ABA Standing 
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, and not the Tax Section of the ABA.  Id.  A 
contemporary commentator suggested Formal Opinion 85-352 was actually adopted in the face of a 
proposal developed by the ABA Tax Section‘s Committee on Standards of Tax Practice and 
approved by the ABA Tax Section‘s membership in May 1984, which would have raised the 
standard to require taxpayers to take a ―meritorious position.‖  See Falk, supra note 18, at 643–44.  
The Tax Section‘s comments on a draft of Formal Opinion 85-352 complained that the new language 
would fail to elevate the minimum standard and that the proposed standard that a position be 
―meritorious‖ would have been more stringent.  Id. at 644 n.8. 
97. Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 635, 636 
(1986) [hereinafter Report]. 
98. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). 
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a lawyer, in representing a client in the course of the 
preparation of the client‘s tax return, may advise the 
statement of positions most favorable to the client if the 
lawyer has a good faith belief that those positions are 
warranted in existing law or can be supported by a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law.  A lawyer can have a good faith belief in this 
context even if the lawyer believes the client‘s position 
probably will not prevail.  However, good faith requires that 
there be some realistic possibility of success if the matter is 
litigated.
99
 
 
The ABA therefore traded in the reasonable basis standard for the ―realistic 
possibility of success‖ standard.100  In the ABA‘s view, the new realistic 
possibility of success was ―an objective standard which can be enforced.‖101 
In addition, the opinion stated that if the position met the realistic possibility 
standard, the lawyer had no duty to require a client to attach riders to the 
return.
102
 
While realistic possibility may have been an improvement over reasonable 
basis,
103
 Opinion 85-352 still suffered from the same flaws as its predecessor 
opinion.  Like Opinion 314, which viewed a tax return as a submission in an 
adversarial proceeding and the lawyer‘s ethical obligations as essentially 
those of an advocate,
104
 Opinion 85-352 continued, and in some ways 
heightened, that view.
105
  Opinion 85-352 notes, quite accurately, that an 
attorney must anticipate that a tax filing may result in an adversarial 
relationship between the client and the IRS.
106
  However, Opinion 85-352 
 
99. Id. (footnote omitted).  Formal Opinion 85-352 did not quantify realistic possibility of 
success.  However, a special task force consisting of tax luminaries later quantified this standard as 
something approaching one-third.  WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 63–64. 
100. Report, supra note 97, at 635. 
101. Id. at 637.  
102. Id.  Recognizing that, despite the advice from an attorney, clients might nevertheless be 
subject to penalties, the opinion suggested that ―[i]n the role of advisor, the lawyer should counsel 
the client as to whether the position is likely to be sustained by a court if cha llenged by the IRS, as 
well as of the potential penalty consequences to the client if the position is taken on the tax return 
without disclosure.‖  Id. 
103. It can be argued that it is practically impossible to differentiate between a ten percent and 
a one-third chance of success.  See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 35, at 64. 
104. Falk, supra note 18, at 646. 
105. Id. at 647.  The proposed revisions to Opinion 314 explicitly rejected that assumption.  Id.  
The proposed revisions maintained that an adversarial proceeding began with an audit.  Id. 
106. However, the low audit rates call into question what the risk actually is.  As Falk notes, 
because the government is not a ―fairly equipped opponent,‖ given that less than one percent of 
returns will be audited, a tax return is not governed by the usual rules of adversarial proceedings.  ―In 
this view the Service is a paper tiger, not a leviathan the taxpayer should defeat by cunning.‖  Id. at 
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takes this notion a step further and asserts that when a taxpayer takes an 
aggressive position, it is more likely to result in an adversarial relationship.
107
  
Thus, the reasoning of Opinion 85-352 appeared to take the perverse position 
that the more aggressive the position, the more an attorney may treat his or 
her role as that of a zealous advocate.
108
  Opinion 85-352 also failed to take 
into account the distinction the Model Rules make between lawyer as 
advocate
109
 and lawyer as advisor.
110
  While the filing of a return may indeed 
be the precursor to most tax controversies, the disclosure and self-assessment 
purposes of tax returns are essentially nonadversarial.
111
  Our voluntary tax 
system necessarily depends upon fair dealing with the government.
112
  Paying 
taxes is not a dispute with the government; it is an obligation of citizenship.
113
  
―Failure to obey the law can result in an adversarial proceeding, but obeying 
the law is something one does for the government, not against it.‖114 
Despite its shortcomings, the realistic possibility of success standard was 
adopted by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.
115
  The 
ABA and the AICPA also encouraged Congress to adopt this standard for the 
return preparer penalty of § 6694 so that a return preparer would not be liable 
for the penalty if the position on the return had a realistic possibility of 
success.
116
  In order to preserve some sense of harmony between the Code and 
Circular 230, the Treasury withdrew its ―substantial authority‖ proposed 
regulations in Circular 230 and adopted new § 10.34 in Circular 230, which 
was designed to mirror the realistic possibility standards adopted by the ABA, 
AICPA, and the preparer penalty provisions of § 6694.  Under § 10.34, a 
practitioner may not advise a client to take a position on a return unless the 
practitioner determines that there is a realistic possibility of the position being 
sustained on its merits, or the position is not frivolous, and the practitioner 
advises the client to adequately disclose the position.
117
 
 
 
647–48. 
107. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). 
108. Id. 
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002). 
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2002). 
111. Falk, supra note 18, at 648. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. AICPA Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice No. 1 (1988).  The AICPA did not, 
however, quantify the standard as a one-third, or any other, chance of success. 
116. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 1396 (1989) (―The committee has adopted this new 
standard because it generally reflects the professional conduct standards applicable to lawyers and to 
certified public accountants.‖). 
117. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1994). 
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―A position is considered to have a realistic possibility of 
being sustained on its merits if a reasonable and well-
informed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax law 
would lead such a person to conclude that the position has 
approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being 
sustained on its merits.‖118 
 
The realistic possibility standard was adopted in final regulations in 1994.
119
  
Accordingly, for non-tax shelter opinions, realistic possibility of success 
became the universal standard for tax advice. 
D.  The Rise of Mega Tax Shelters 
The realistic possibility of success standard was designed to take into 
account the ambiguous nature of the tax laws and to provide an objective 
standard to which lawyers could adhere.
120
  However, the lax one-in-three 
threshold attendant upon that standard also encouraged the aggressive, pro-
taxpayer side of tax lawyers.  Lawyers did not need that encouragement.  As 
Randolph Paul noted more than half a century ago, ―The ethical problems 
presented to tax advisers are of a more subtle character.  Borderline questions 
are presented which usually have enough potential argument in their favor to 
furnish some basis for rationalization leading to a decision to act in the 
apparent immediate financial interest of the taxpayer.‖121  Thus, there has 
always been both an ethical and financial incentive to favor the client‘s 
position.
122
 
In the 1990s, changes in the legal and accounting marketplace magnified 
this issue.  Firms became more entrepreneurial, and ―consulting‖ became one 
of the largest parts of large accounting firm practices.
123
  Prior to its demise as 
the result of action taken on behalf of Enron, Arthur Andersen was said to 
have received up to $100 million in fees per year from Enron.
124
  With larger 
fees, some in the millions of dollars, the temptation to use vague and 
aggressive tax advice standards became too great.
125
  The combination of new 
 
118. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(4)(i) (1994). 
119. T.D. 8545, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523, 1994-2 C.B. 415 (June 20, 1994). 
120. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). 
121. Paul, supra note 34, at 413; see also George Cooper, The Avoidance Dynamic: A Tale of 
Tax Planning, Tax Ethics, and Tax Reform, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1553, 1555 (1980). 
122. See Paul, supra note 34, at 413. 
123. This change in the industry has occurred both in the United States and internationally.  See 
Daniel Muzio, The Professional Project and the Contemporary Re-Organisation of the Legal 
Profession in England and Wales, 11 INT‘L J. LEGAL  PROF. 33, 34 (2004). 
124. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?  A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 
1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 281 n.43 (2004). 
125. Id. at 282. 
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vehicles in corporate finance and the desire of public accounting firms, banks, 
and law firms to generate significant revenues based on contingency or 
premium fees, instead of traditional billable hours, led to new mega 
shelters.
126
  The hallmark of the new tax shelters was to develop a scheme, 
usually involving numerous transactions, which involved exploiting obscure 
imperfections in the tax law to produce results that ―would not have been 
intended if they had been foreseen, and which are likely to be corrected soon 
after they are discovered.‖127  These schemes often involved sophisticated 
financial products, special-use entities, and offshore banks not subject to U.S. 
taxation.
128
 
Some have argued that the current spate of tax shelters, while troubling, is 
not necessarily new.
129
  Professor James S. Eustice, for one, has dubbed 
current shelters as merely ―old brine in new bottles.‖130  Nor is the view that 
some lawyers and accountants are not acting appropriately new.  Statements 
from eminent tax lawyers and scholars at the Tax Law Review‘s 1952 banquet 
lamented the conduct of tax lawyers of the day.
131
  Professor Edmond Cahn 
stated that lawyers ―may be fast losing our status as a profession and 
becoming nothing more than skilled merchant-clerks.‖132 
While tax shelters are indeed nothing new, and the estimated current 
revenue loss is not appreciably greater than in past generations of shelters,
133
 
 
126. See Korb, supra note 45, at 420. 
127. Id. at 421. 
128. See, e.g., ACM P‘ship. v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1998). 
129. For example, Senator Paul Douglas made the following notable statement regarding tax 
loopholes (or ―truck holes‖ as he referred to them) on the Senate floor on May 26, 1961: ―These 
gentlemen [lawyers and accountants] help citizens to avoid and, in some cases, to evade the payment 
of taxes which in all good conscience they should pay.  A bewildering variety of tax ‗gimmicks‘ and 
arguments are developed with which the revenue officials and the courts are either unable or 
unwilling to cope.‖  107 CONG. REC. 9115 (1961) (statement of Sen. Douglas). 
130. See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old “Brine” In New Bottles, 55 
TAX L. REV. 135, 172 (2002) (―Granting that there is a problem here—and a serious one at that—it is 
not a new one.  Corporate ‗tax management‘ has been going on as long as the corporate tax rate 
exceeded zero.  While packaged in new and exotic wrappers, it is still the same old, same old thing.‖ 
(footnote omitted)). 
131. See, e.g., Edmond Cahn, Opening Remarks to Ethical Problems of Tax Practitioners, 
Address at the Tax Law Review‘s 1952 Banquet, in 8 TAX L. REV. 1, 1 (1952). 
132. Id.  It may be argued that lawyers have never been free from the charge that they (we) will 
make any argument if the price is right.  See, e.g.,  JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 478–83 (2008) (quoting commentators of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, who opined, ―No one ever became an advocate, save to deliver himself from poverty‖; 
―Clerks go to Bologna to learn law and duplicity, and consequently they get rich and lose their 
souls‖; and ―[D]espite lawyers‘ professed devotion to justice, in reality they would take any case, no 
matter how flimsy, and do or say anything for any client, no matter how wicked, provided that the 
client paid their fees.‖). 
133. IRS estimates it lost $3.6 billion in 1983.  See Randall Smith & Kenneth H. Bacon, Boom 
in Tax Shelters Artificially Lifts Prices of Much Real Estate, WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 1.  In 
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these Generation X shelters are nevertheless different.  The current shelters 
are invested in by high net-worth individuals and corporations,
134
 and the 
magnitude of the losses claimed by each investor in these shelters dwarfs the 
deductions claimed by shelter investors in the 1970s.
135
  For example, the 
taxpayer in ACM Partnership claimed a capital loss of $84,997,111 resulting 
from its London Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR) notes transaction.
136
  By 
contrast, the shelters of the 1970s were invested in by thousands of 
individuals, including middle-class taxpayers, thereby giving those shelters an 
oddly democratic feel about them.
137
  This demographic change has, I believe, 
exacerbated the ―disrespect for the tax system‖ that so concerns Congress.138  
Other issues outside of the shelter industry, from the $350 billion ―tax gap‖ to 
the need for reform or repeal of the Alternative Minimum Tax, have put a 
premium on tax enforcement and have spurred the desire to ―do something‖ 
about the tax shelter issue. 
It can also be argued that the type of advisors involved in shelters has 
changed over the years.  In the past, the shelter industry was populated by 
professionals at the periphery of the profession.
139
  The advisors involved in 
the current shelters worked for some of the most prestigious accounting and 
law firms.  Thus, while lawyers during the early part of the twentieth century 
were the celebrities of the day, garnering both wealth and fame,
140
 tax lawyers 
and other tax professionals in the first part of the twenty-first century have 
achieved a different sort of notoriety.  Arthur Andersen, the largest and oldest 
international accounting firm, was indicted and, as a result, went out of 
 
2007 dollars, that amount is $7.6 billion.  The IRS estimates $10 billion in losses from tax shelters 
currently.  Mary Williams Walsh, Treasury Department Cracks Down on Tax Shelters for Firms, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2000, at C-1.  Thus, the amount of money lost, while troubling, is not 
appreciably higher than in past eras. 
134. While they have commonly been called corporate tax shelters, many of these shelters were 
also marketed to high net-worth individuals.  See Korb, supra note 45, at 420 n.1. 
135. See, e.g., Glass v. Comm‘r, 87 T.C. 1087 (1986) (a consolidated case with 1400 
petitioners). 
136. ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d 232, 243 (3d Cir. 1998). 
137. Korb, supra note 45, at 414. 
138. See generally PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS, supra note 13. 
139. See, e.g., Goldberg v. United States, 789 F.2d 1341, 1342–43 (9th Cir. 1986) (describing 
―Margolis transactions‖ typical of shelters peddled by Harry Margolis, which were ―characterized by 
convoluted transfers of overvalued property rights, circular money movements among foreign trusts, 
delayed drafting, signing and backdating of documents, and client oblivion to the financial realities 
of their investments‖); J.P. Wenchel, Discussion of the Papers for Ethical Problems of Tax 
Practitioners, Address at the Tax Law Review‘s 1952 Banquet, in 8 TAX L. REV. 1, 24 (1952) (―It is 
the blackleg—and he was always in the profession.  What are you going to do about him?  He is on 
the fringe of society.‖). 
140. See, e.g., JOHN CAMPBELL, F.E. SMITH, FIRST EARL OF BIRKENHEAD 112, 113–14 
(Pimlico 1983). 
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business due to its involvement in the tax activities of Enron.
141
  The 
international accounting firm of KPMG escaped indictment only by agreeing 
to a deferred prosecution agreement and a $450-million fine.
142
  Lawyers and 
accountants have been indicted and pleaded guilty.
143
  With the involvement 
and indictment of leaders of the profession in the tax shelter industry, the 
problem is at least perceived to be larger and one requiring more attention.
144
 
Others blame changes in the method of statutory interpretation for the 
increase in shelter activity.  Professors Noel B. Cunningham and James R. 
Repetti argue that the recent proliferation of tax shelters has, at least in part, 
been caused by the ascendancy of textualism or hyper-textualism.
145
  They 
assert that tax advisors have become more aggressive in structuring 
transactions that comply with the literal terms of a statute ―even though the 
transactions may be highly questionable in light of the legislation‘s history or 
underlying purpose.  The result has been a cottage industry where investment 
banks and accounting firms market tax shelters that triumph in form, but not 
substance, at the expense of the fisc.‖ 146 
Regardless of whether the current shelters are indeed anything new, or just 
―old brine in new bottles,‖147 the response of the government is no doubt 
different.  Both Congress and the Treasury have acted to curtail tax shelters in 
new and sometimes troubling ways.  The following part will discuss several 
of the government‘s actions. 
III.  RECENT GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
The government has, over the years, tried different tacks for attacking 
shelters.  In recent years, both Congress and the Treasury have tried to define 
what a shelter is.  As discussed more fully below, this effort has proven 
unsuccessful.  As a result, Congress has essentially thrown up its hands, 
ceding more authority to the Treasury to decide what an abusive shelter is, to 
gather information on taxpayer positions, and to impose penalties.  As I argue 
 
141. See Coffee, supra note 124, at 281. 
142.  Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: 
The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1283 (2007). 
143. See, e.g., id.; Gregory L. Diskant, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, LITIG., Winter 
2008, at 5, 5. 
144. For purposes of government regulation, perception is reality.  If Congress and the 
Treasury believe (as they appear to) that the newest crop of shelters is significantly worse than 
previous iterations, they will take action.  Moreover, Congress did in fact attack the previous shelters 
with enactments in 1982 and 1986.  See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 
(1986). 
145. Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 2. 
146. Id. (footnote omitted). 
147. See Eustice, supra note 130. 
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below, none of these efforts will solve the tax shelter problem, and the result 
will, unfortunately, be fewer taxpayers getting good, solid tax advice.  In this 
part, I will discuss the covered opinion rules and the amendments to the return 
advice standard in both § 6694 of Title 26 of the United States Code and § 
10.34 of Circular 230.  I focus on these new provisions because they are 
emblematic of the government‘s anti-shelter efforts and provide a framework 
for analyzing what the government can and should do. 
A.  The Covered Opinion Rules 
The first of the government‘s most recent actions was an effort to attack 
tax shelters by requiring lawyers and accountants to issue extensive, long-
form opinion letters in all shelter-like transactions, known as ―covered 
opinions.‖  The covered opinion rules were based on the accurate premise that 
tax shelter opinions were essentially incomplete and misleading.  Many tax 
shelter opinions simply ignored key facts or the implications of those facts or 
ignored issues entirely.  The covered opinion rules sought to rectify these 
problems by requiring tax professionals to fully address all of the facts and 
legal issues in a tax shelter opinion.  However, the Treasury would only 
require these exhaustive opinions in the case of a tax shelter, which 
necessarily required the Treasury to first define a tax shelter.  Unfortunately, 
the definitions used in the covered opinion rules were so broad and 
unworkable that these rules appeared to cover all tax advice and negatively 
impacted legitimate tax advice. 
1.  Defining Tax Shelters 
Coherently defining what constitutes a tax shelter has proven difficult for 
Congress, the IRS, the courts, and academics.  Arguably the most accurate 
definition comes from Professor Michael Graetz, who defined a tax shelter as 
―[a] deal done by very smart people that, absent tax considerations, would be 
very stupid.‖148  While eloquent and perfectly descriptive, this definition is not 
terribly helpful in deciding when tax planning has crossed the line into 
abusive tax avoidance.  The term ―tax shelter‖ itself is defined in the Internal 
Revenue Code only in § 6662(d) and is defined as a partnership or other 
entity, or any investment plan or arrangement, ―if a significant purpose of 
such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of 
Federal income tax.‖149  While perhaps more helpful than Professor Graetz‘s 
 
148. Tom Herman, A Special Summary and Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at A1 (quoting Professor Michael Graetz). 
149. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).  Opinions on tax shelters have 
always been treated differently from other tax issues.  Unlike non-tax shelter opinions, which only 
require a ―realistic possibility of success on the merits‖ (a one-in-three chance) or ―substantial 
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definition, it is still not very illuminating.  Indeed, it could be argued that a 
―significant purpose‖ of anything a tax lawyer advises a client to do has at 
least as a significant purpose the avoidance of tax.
150
  Professor Eustice and 
other scholars have summarized the indicia of an abusive tax shelter 
transaction.
151
  However, these indicia are more descriptive than definitional, 
and they do not purport to be a general guide to demarcating the border 
between planning and abuse.
152
  ABA Formal Opinion 346 defined a tax 
shelter as  
 
an investment which has as a significant feature either . . . or 
both of the following attributes: (1) deductions in excess of 
income from the investment being available in any year to 
reduce income from other sources in that year, and (2) credits 
in excess of the tax attributable to the income from the 
investment being available in any year to offset taxes on 
income from other sources in that year.
153
 
 
This too appeared to be a rather targeted definition of tax shelters and not a 
general shelter definition.
154
 
2.  Covered Opinions 
With this history in mind, the Treasury took its shot at defining (and 
deterring) abusive shelters when it amended Circular 230 and adopted the 
covered opinion rules.
155
 Under the rules that became effective in June 
2005,
156
 if a tax practitioner provides written advice on certain types of 
 
authority‖ (somewhere between one in three and fifty percent), tax shelter opinions require the 
practitioner to determine that the issue is ―more likely than not‖ to succeed on the merits if 
challenged.  The more likely than not standard is defined as greater than a fifty percent chance of 
success.  See supra Part II. 
150. Schler, supra note 1, at 329. 
151. See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 130, at 158–59; see also Korb, supra note 45, at 421.  In Part 
III.D infra, I will discuss other proposals by scholars to resolve the current tax shelter problem. 
152. Nevertheless, Congress and the Treasury have used some of these indicia in defining what 
is a ―reportable transaction,‖ which would require taxpayers to disclose investments in transactions 
that possess these indicia.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).  Again, what constitutes a 
―reportable transaction‖ was never intended to provide a global definition of what constitutes a tax 
shelter. 
153. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 n.1 (1982). 
154. See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., ABA Formal Opinion 346 and a New Statutory Penalty Regime, 
111 TAX NOTES 1269, 1270 (2006). 
155. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (2005). 
156. The final regulations effective May 19, 2005, came after several sets of proposed 
regulations and amendments.  See 70 Fed. Reg. 28,824 (May 19, 2005); 69 Fed. Reg. 75,839 (Dec. 
20, 2004). 
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investments,
157
 defined as a ―covered opinion,‖ the advice must be given in 
the form of a ―covered opinion‖ consistent with the rules of § 10.35.158  Thus, 
both the type of investment and the type of opinion letter required were 
referred to as covered opinions.
159
  As set forth below, the type of investment 
that constitutes a covered opinion (read tax shelter) is far from clear under the 
regulations.  Moreover, the requirements that must be followed in drafting a 
covered opinion are detailed, time-consuming, and expensive for clients.
160
  
However, if the written communication does concern a covered opinion and 
the practitioner does not satisfy all of the covered opinion requirements of 
§ 10.35, the practitioner can face disciplinary action by the Treasury.
161
  As a 
result, practitioners were loathe to provide any advice and defaulted to a 
strategy of ―legending out‖ of the covered opinion rules by attaching 
disclaimers denying penalty protection for their clients.
162
 
Under the regulations, a ―covered opinion‖ is any written communication, 
including emails, letters, and memoranda, that give advice on any tax issue as 
long as the opinion concerns one of three types of investment.
163
  The first 
type of investment is so-called listed transactions.
164
  Listed transactions are 
investments or schemes that the Treasury has specifically listed in public 
announcements as being abusive tax shelters.
165
  If the investment is, or is 
substantially similar to a listed transaction, a covered opinion must be 
issued.
166
 
The second type of investment is one that has as its ―principal purpose‖ 
the avoidance or evasion of any tax (not just income taxes) imposed by the 
Internal Revenue Code.
167
  For purposes of the covered opinion rules, the 
principal purpose of an investment is the avoidance or evasion of any tax 
imposed by the Internal Revenue Code ―if that purpose exceeds any other 
 
157. The covered opinion rules echo the language of § 6662(d) and use the phrase ―a 
partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or other plan or arrangement.‖  31 
C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10).  Throughout this discussion, I will use the word ―investment‖ to cover this 
more latitudinous definition.  See 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
158. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c) (2005). 
159. This redundant use of the term ―covered opinion‖ contributed to the confusion 
surrounding the requirements of § 10.35. 
160. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.31(d) (2005). 
161. 31 C.F.R. § 10.60 (2005). 
162. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2005). 
163. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2) (2005). 
164. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(A) (2005). 
165. Listed transactions are a subset of reportable transactions under 26 U.S.C. § 6111 (2000 & 
Supp. V 2006); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6707A (West 2007); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2008). 
166. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.6011-4(b)(2). 
167. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(B) (2005). 
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purpose.‖168  Commentators were concerned about the broad definition of 
―principal purpose‖169 and the difficulty a practitioner would have in 
determining whether a client‘s purpose in investing in an entity involved 
primarily tax avoidance or some other purpose.  In addition, many 
practitioners rightly expressed concern that some investments have as their 
principal purpose the avoidance of federal tax and are yet perfectly acceptable 
under the Code.  For example, family limited partnerships, where one of the 
main reasons for such investment plans is the avoidance of federal estate tax, 
could be a covered opinion.
170
  Likewise an S corporation, arguably the sole 
purpose of which is to avoid corporate level tax and/or self-employment taxes, 
would also be a covered opinion.
171
  Commentators wondered whether every 
piece of written advice recommending the use of an S corporation must be 
made via a long-form covered opinion.
172
 
When the final regulations were adopted, the ―principal purpose‖ 
definition was limited to provide that the principal purpose of an investment is 
not to avoid or evade federal tax if that investment ―has as its purpose the 
claiming of tax benefits in a manner consistent with the statute and 
Congressional purpose.‖173  This language resolved the thorny issue raised by 
the commentators and, by doing so, the Treasury acknowledged that some tax 
planning, and indeed some ―tax shelters,‖ are acceptable under current law.174 
The third type of investment is one in which a ―significant purpose‖ is the 
avoidance or evasion of any federal tax.
175
  Standing alone, this definition 
would cover any advice given by a tax practitioner.  This broad definition is 
limited by the qualifiers that the written advice be either (1) a ―reliance 
opinion,‖176 (2) a ―marketed opinion,‖177 (3) ―subject to conditions of 
confidentiality,‖178 or (4) subject to ―contractual protection.‖179  Because 
 
168. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) (2005). 
169. Id.; see T.D. 9201, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,824, 28,825 (May 19, 2005). 
170. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10). 
171. Id. 
172. See T.D. 9201, 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,825. 
173. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10). 
174. I will return to the limiting language, ―consistent with the statute and Congressional 
purpose,‖ in the discussion of a workable standard for tax advice. 
175. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C) (2005). 
176. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(1) (2005) (emphasis omitted). 
177. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(2) (2005) (emphasis omitted) (an opinion that is used by 
promoters to market a particular investment plan, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(5)(i) (2005)). 
178. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(3) (2005) (emphasis omitted) (the taxpayer can only learn of 
the investment if he or she promises not to disclose the terms of the plan, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(6) 
(2005)). 
179. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C)(4) (2005) (emphasis omitted) (the taxpayer may obtain a 
refund of fees paid to the professional should the IRS challenge the plan and the taxpayer has to 
repay the tax benefits, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(7) (2005)). 
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typical tax advice does not involve marketed opinions or opinions subject to 
contractual protection or confidentiality requirements,
180
 the most important 
qualifier concerns reliance opinions. 
Unlike the other covered opinion definitions, in which the definitions are 
based on the kind of investment the taxpayer is seeking advice on, a reliance 
opinion is determined by the level of certainty reached in the opinion.
181
  A 
reliance opinion is any written advice ―if the advice concludes at a confidence 
level of at least more likely than not (a greater than 50 percent likelihood) that 
one or more significant Federal tax issues would be resolved in the taxpayer‘s 
favor.‖182  Conversely, a written communication or email will not be treated as 
a reliance opinion ―if the practitioner prominently discloses in the written 
advice that it was not intended or written by the practitioner to be used, and 
that it cannot be used by the taxpayer, for the purpose of avoiding penalties 
that may be imposed on the taxpayer.‖183  This dichotomy left many 
practitioners with the impression that all tax advice, including emails, was 
required either to be in the form of a covered opinion or contain a no-reliance 
disclaimer.
184
  This impression was reinforced by an unrelated section of the 
covered opinion rules requiring that if an opinion does not reach a conclusion 
at a confidence level of at least more likely than not, the opinion must contain 
the no-reliance disclaimer.
185
 
However, a close reading of the reliance opinion rule shows that written 
advice will be a reliance opinion (and therefore a covered opinion) only if the 
practitioner reaches a more likely than not opinion.
186
  If a practitioner reaches 
a conclusion at a confidence level less than more likely than not, it is not a 
covered opinion.
187
  Nothing prevented a practitioner from giving a favorable 
opinion at less than the more likely than not opinion standard, and clients 
could rely on that advice and obtain protection from penalties in most cases.
188
  
 
180. Many ―modern‖ tax shelters had as one of their characteristics that they were marketed to 
many potential ―investors,‖ that they offered protection to the investor in the form of contractual 
protection, or that they would only be disclosed to potential investors on the condition that the 
investor/target agreed not to disclose the details of the investment.  See, e.g., Korb, supra note 45, at 
421.  Given that these types of investments or plans were more typical of tax shelters, making advice 
regarding these investments more difficult does not impede legitimate tax advice. 
181. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(i) (2005). 
182. Id. 
183. 31 C.F.R. 10.35(b)(4)(ii) (2005). 
184. And a number of articles have contributed to this misunderstanding.  See, e.g., Dan W. 
Holbrook, Where There’s a Will: Revenge of the IRS: Circular 230 Changes Law Practice, 41 TENN. 
B.J. 28, 30 (2005); Scott E. Vincent, New IRS Tax Shelter Rules May Require Disclosures for 
Broadly Defined “Tax Advice,” 61 J. MO. B. 213, 213 (2005). 
185. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e)(4) (2005). 
186. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4) (2005). 
187. Id. 
188. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6664 (West 2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2008).  But see 26 U.S.C. 
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Moreover, while the seemingly categorical statement of subsection (e)(4) that 
all opinions that do not reach a more likely than not conclusion must include a 
no-penalty disclaimer, a closer reading of this provision shows this is not the 
case.
189
  Clause (4) is part of subsection (e), which begins: ―A covered opinion 
must contain all of the following disclosures that apply.‖190  Since an opinion 
given at less than a more likely than not level is not a covered opinion, a no-
reliance disclaimer is not required.
191
 
Despite the limited coverage of the reliance opinions, given the ambiguity 
of the regulations and the possibility of sanctions for failure to follow the 
covered opinion rules, practitioners determined that discretion—and 
disclaimers—were the better part of valor.  It has therefore become standard 
practice for most firms that give tax advice to include in every email or 
written product, even routine, non-tax related communications with clients or 
other lawyers, language to the effect that ―this communication may not be 
relied upon for penalty protection.‖  The ubiquitous nature of the penalty-
protection disclaimer soon lowered the disclaimers to a farcical level, with 
one internet vendor marketing coffee mugs, t-shirts, and even underwear 
emblazoned with the no-penalty-protection mantra.
192
 
The result of the covered opinion rules was that practitioners became more 
careful and parsimonious with their tax advice. While the covered opinion 
rules can be parsed with some effort, the breadth and coverage of these rules 
are still far from clear in many cases.  Moreover, the provisions are 
unacceptably complex with numerous defined terms and overlapping 
standards and definitions.
193
  The standard for giving tax advice simply cannot 
consist of numerous pages of dense text—such a standard is completely 
unworkable.
194
  Tax lawyers and accountants cannot be spending more time 
trying to figure out what the tax advice standard means than applying it to 
provide tax advice.  The truly bad actors who do not care about real tax advice 
will still peddle abusive transactions, and there is little to be gained by an 
unadvised taxpayer community.
195
  As Mark Johnson argued: 
 
6694(a)(1) (2000) (authorizing penalties for understatements due to unreasonable positions).  In 
addition, as is discussed in the next part, providing an opinion below the more likely than not 
standard may now require disclosure of the position on the return. 
189. See 31 C.F.R. § 1035(e)(4). 
190. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(e) (2005) (emphasis added). 
191. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(2)(C) (2005); 31 C.F.R. 10.35(b)(4) (2005). 
192. Café Press, http://shop.cafepress.com/no-penalty (last visited Nov. 13, 2008). 
193. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.35. 
194. In addition to being bad policy, the covered opinion rules may also be unconstitutional.  
See David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amendment 
Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech By Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 843, 844 
(2006). 
195. See Freedman, supra note 43, at 346 n.68.  
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If he [the average taxpayer] can receive expert advice which 
he trusts, he will follow that advice.  If he does not, he will 
use a do-it-yourself kit of his own.  It is this latter prospect at 
which we should all shudder—not as tax experts who will be 
done out of fees, but as citizens facing the breakdown of our 
voluntary compliance system.  It is vital for us to distinguish 
between tax avoidance under a system of respectable expert 
advice, and the wholesale tax evasion which would be 
accomplished by a skeptical and unadvised citizenry.  Right 
now, all the highly publicized tax avoidance gadgets amount 
to a narrow strip of gray between the accepted blacks and 
whites of the law.  That small blemish on the purity of our tax 
structure is indeed a slight price to pay for keeping the black 
and the white as separate as they are; the alternative could be 
one large smudge of dirty gray.
196
 
B.  Revised Opinion Standards: More Likely Than Not 
The other major course of action, presumably undertaken to improve tax 
advisors‘ ethics and deter tax shelters,197 was the amendment of the tax 
preparer penalties.  As discussed at length above,
198
 the general standard 
applicable to tax advice since the mid-1980s has been the realistic possibility 
of success standard.
199
  That standard was enforced in part by § 6694, which 
imposes penalties against tax return preparers who give tax advice that falls 
 
 
―It is important not to make life more difficult for the compliant, but to 
concentrate regulatory resources on the non-compliant.  If the uncertainty at the 
borderline affects those who wish to comply it will be unacceptable but if it 
simply makes it difficult for those who wish to manipulate the rules then it may 
be acceptable.‖ 
Id. 
196. Johnson, supra note 37, at 30; see also Thomas J. Graves, Responsibility of the Tax 
Adviser, 114 J. ACC‘Y NO. 6, 33, 35 (1962) (―Certainly a well-advised taxpayer is more likely to 
observe good standards than one who is ill-advised and, being uninformed, feels himself free to take 
refuge in his own subjective views of what the law might be.‖). 
197. I use the word ―presumably‖ because there is no indication in the legislative history as to 
why Congress enacted the revisions to 26 U.S.C. § 6694.  See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
110TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE ―SMALL BUSINESS AND WORK OPPORTUNITY TAX 
ACT OF 2007‖ AND PENSION RELATED PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN H.R. 2206, at 34 (Comm. Print 
2007) [hereinafter TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 2206].  One can only presume that it was 
undertaken to improve practitioner conduct.  Whether it will have this beneficial effect remains to be 
seen. 
198. See supra Part II. 
199. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007). 
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below the realistic possibility standard.
200
  Indeed, it was after the adoption of 
this standard in § 6694 that the Treasury embraced the realistic possibility 
standard as the general standard for tax advice in § 10.34 of Circular 230.  
Congress and the Treasury substantially altered that standard with the 
amendment of § 6694 by the Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act 
of 2007 and the Treasury‘s proposed changes to § 10.34 of Circular 230.201 
Prior to its amendment in 2007, the penalty under § 6694(a) applied to any 
income tax return preparer
202
 if (1) any part of an understatement of liability 
was due to a position for which there was not a realistic possibility of being 
sustained on its merits; (2) the return preparer knew or reasonably should have 
known of such position; and (3) the position was not disclosed or was 
frivolous.
203
  Thus, for purposes of § 6694, as long as the position met the 
realistic possibility of success standard, the penalty was not applicable.
204
 
As amended, § 6694(a) broadened the application of the penalty from 
―income tax return preparers‖ to ―[a]ny tax return preparer,‖ including 
preparers of estate tax, gift tax, and employment tax returns.
205
  The 
amendments also increased the amount of the penalty from a relatively 
modest $250 per return to the greater of $1,000 or fifty percent of the income 
derived or to be derived by the practitioner.
206
  With fees for tax advice 
routinely in the thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars, this penalty 
could be substantial indeed.
207
  The revised penalty would apply if (1) the 
preparer knew or should have known of the position; (2) the position did not 
meet the more likely than not standard; and (3) the position was not disclosed 
or there was no reasonable basis for the position.
208
 
 
200. 26 U.S.C. § 6694(a) (2000). 
201. Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 190 
(2007); Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 54,621 
(Sept. 26, 2007) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). 
202. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(a)(36) (West 2007) (defining income tax return preparer).  Moreover, 
the realistic possibility of success standard in Circular 230 was adopted by the Treasury in response 
to the amendment of § 6694 in 1986 and that section‘s use of the realistic possibility of success 
standard.  Regulations Governing the Practice of Attorneys, Certified Public Accountants, Enrolled 
Agents, and Enrolled Actuaries Before the Internal Revenue Service, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,523 (June 20, 
1994). 
203. 26 U.S.C. § 6694 (2000). 
204. As discussed above, the Treasury‘s adoption of the realistic possibility standard as part of 
Circular 230 in 1994 was in reaction to Congress‘s enactment of § 6694 and its realistic possibility 
standard.  See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
205. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a) (West 2007) (emphasis added). 
206. Id. 
207. Given the ambiguity of the more likely than not standard, these penalties threaten the 
righteous as well as the evil (in fact, they are probably more of a threat to the righteous).  
208. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a)(2) (West 2007). 
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This revision to the penalties applicable to return advice was not proposed 
by the Treasury or the IRS.  In fact, the Chief Counsel of the IRS admitted 
that the Treasury was ―blindsided‖ by the amendments.209  Moreover, the 
amendments originated not in the Senate Finance Committee nor in the House 
Ways and Means Committee, but rather in the House Rules Committee, and 
there is little legislative history on this portion of the Act.
210
  In part because 
of this dubious lineage, the implications of these amendments were not fully 
vetted, and the amendments created several implementation problems for the 
Treasury.
211
 
C.  Problems Fitting In 
The first change wrought by the § 6694 amendments, and one of the most 
necessary, was the Treasury‘s proposed regulations amending the general 
standard providing tax advice under Circular 230.
212
  As discussed above, 
 
209. See generally Lee A. Sheppard, Government Officials Discuss Partnership, Shelter Issues, 
TAX ANALYSTS, June 4, 2007. 
210. The only legislative material on this portion of the Act is the Joint Committee‘s Technical 
Explanation of the “Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007” and Pension Related 
Provisions Contained in H.R. 2206.  That report provides as follows: 
 
The provision also alters the standards of conduct that must be met to 
avoid imposition of the penalties for preparing a return with respect to which 
there is an understatement of tax. First, the provision replaces the realistic 
possibility standard for undisclosed positions with a requirement that there be a 
reasonable belief that the tax treatment of the position was more likely than not 
the proper treatment. The provision replaces the not-frivolous standard 
accompanied by disclosure with the requirement that there be a reasonable basis 
for the tax treatment of the position accompanied by disclosure. 
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 2206, supra note 197, at 34. 
211. In addition to dealing with the implementation problems, the Treasury attempted to shape 
the meaning of the amendments by putting its own spin on what § 6694 provides.  A close reading of 
the 2007 amendments to § 6694 shows that a return preparer will be liable for the penalty only if (1) 
the preparer knew or reasonably should have known of the position; (2) the position did not meet the 
more likely than not standard; and (3) the position was not disclosed or there was no reasonable basis 
for the position.  26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a).  Thus, as drafted, as long as there was a reasonable basis for 
the position, whether disclosed or not, the penalty should not apply.  Id.  The Treasury was clearly 
troubled by the literal terms of the statute, since the penalty would not apply, regardless of disclosure 
or the position met the more likely than not standard.  Id.  Hence, the amendments would lower, not 
raise, the standard applicable to tax advice. One IRS employee told me that, in his opinion, Congress 
could have been ―a little clearer‖ in its wording of § 6694(a).  In an effort to effect what it believes 
the intent of Congress to be, the Treasury issued Notice 2007-54, in which the Treasury interprets 
§ 6694 to read that the penalty will be applicable if the position was not disclosed and there was no 
reasonable basis for the position.  I.R.S. Notice 2007-54, 2007-27 I.R.B. 1, 12.  This interpretation 
appears to be contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. 
212. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007).  As discussed, supra note 201 and accompanying text, the 
Treasury initially employed the realistic possibility of success standard in Circular 230 in response to 
the inclusion of that standard in the § 6694 penalties in 1994.  With the 2007 amendments to § 6694, 
the Treasury now feels free to revise the Circular 230 standards. 
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under § 10.34 of Circular 230, a practitioner could advise a client to take a 
position on a return as long as the position had a realistic possibility of 
success on the merits.  Obviously, that standard had to be changed to resolve 
the conflict between amended § 6694 and § 10.34.  Under the revised version 
of § 10.34, a practitioner may not advise a client to take a position on a tax 
return, or prepare the portion of a tax return on which a position is taken, 
unless (1) the practitioner has a reasonable belief that the position satisfies the 
more likely than not standard; or (2) the position has a reasonable basis and is 
adequately disclosed.
213
  The proposed amendments thus revise § 10.34 to 
conform to amended § 6694 (or at least the Treasury‘s interpretation of § 
6694), and more likely than not (i.e., a greater than fifty-percent chance of 
success). 
Unfortunately, the amendments to § 10.34 create their own downstream 
problems as well.  For example, the revision to § 10.34 may require the 
Treasury to revisit the covered opinion rules—more specifically, the rules 
applicable to reliance opinions.  As discussed above, advice is a reliance 
opinion—and therefore a covered opinion—only if the practitioner opines that 
the position has a more likely than not chance of success.
214
  With the 
amendments to § 6694, a practitioner would face penalties of up to fifty 
percent of the fees earned unless he or she issued a more likely than not 
opinion or the position was disclosed.
215
  As a result, unless the covered 
opinion rules are modified, it appears that all written tax advice will either 
have to be in the form of a covered opinion or contain the no-reliance 
disclaimer, or the position with respect to that advice will have to be disclosed 
on the return.  This makes the reliance opinion standard nearly superfluous. 
Second, the Treasury has issued interim guidance and proposed 
regulations designed to deal with what it has termed ―the complexities and 
anomalies‖ resulting from the inconsistent treatment of return preparers under 
the § 6694 amendments and of taxpayers under the accuracy-related penalty 
provisions applicable to taxpayers, as well as the inconsistencies between the 
§ 6694 amendments and Circular 230.
216
  For example, the 2007 amendments 
to § 6694 provide, in essence, that a practitioner may not advise a taxpayer to 
take a position on a return unless the position has a more likely than not 
chance of success or the position is disclosed to the IRS.  However, under § 
 
213. 72 Fed. Reg. 54,621, 54,622 (Sept. 26, 2007). 
214. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4) (2007). 
215. Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, 121 Stat. 203 
(2007). 
216. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282.  In addition to Notice 2008-13, the Treasury 
has issued Notice 2007-54, Notice 2008-11, and Notice 2008-14, and on June 17, 2008, issued 
proposed regulations under § 6694 and § 7701.  Tax Return Preparer Penalties Under Sections 6694 
and 6695, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560 (June 17, 2008). 
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6662(d), a taxpayer may take a position on a return without disclosure as long 
as the position meets the lower standard of ―substantial authority.‖217  Thus, as 
a result of the amendments to § 6694, tax practitioners were subject to a 
higher standard than their clients.  Given these divergent standards, what may 
the practitioner advise his or her client?  Should the practitioner advise: 
―There is something called substantial authority but I cannot advise you take a 
position that meets that standard.‖?  The differing standards between advisor 
and client, and the real possibility that the advisor could face substantial 
penalties, thus created a conflict of interest between advisors and their clients. 
The Treasury recognized this problem and essentially declined to enforce 
certain provisions of amended § 6694.  Under the proposed regulations,
218
 a 
return preparer may advise a client to take a position on a return even though 
the return preparer does not have a reasonable belief that the position would 
more likely than not be sustained on the merits, as long as the position has a 
reasonable basis and the position is ―disclosed‖ in one of the following ways: 
(1) the position is actually disclosed on the return or on a properly completed 
Form 8275; (2) the return preparer provides the client with the prepared tax 
return that includes the disclosure statement; or (3) if the position meets the 
substantial authority standard (and therefore the client is not required to 
disclose the position), the return preparer ―advises the taxpayer of all the 
penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under section 6662.‖219  Thus, 
while Congress mandated in its 2007 amendments to § 6694 that a position on 
a return either meet the more likely than not standard or the position is 
required to be disclosed on the return,
220
 the Treasury will not impose the 
penalty against tax professionals as long as they advise their clients on the 
ways to comply with the substantial authority standard.  Moreover, the 
requirement of § 6694 that the position must be disclosed may be satisfied by 
the return preparer ―disclosing‖ to the client (and not the IRS).221  The net 
 
217. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
218. Tax Return Preparer Penalties Under Sections 6694 and 6695, 73 Fed. Reg. at 34,562. 
219. Id. at 34,565.  The return preparer must also contemporaneously document the advice in 
the tax return preparer‘s files.  Id. at 34,566.  In addition, return preparers may satisfy the disclosure 
requirement in the case of a tax shelter or reportable transaction, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 
6662(d)(2)(C) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) or 26 U.S.C. § 6662A (Supp. IV 2004), if the return preparer 
advises the taxpayer that there must be, at a minimum, substantial authority for the position, that the 
taxpayer must possess a reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper 
treatment in order to avoid a penalty under § 6662(d) or § 6662A as applicable, and that disclosure 
will not protect the taxpayer from assessment of an accuracy-related penalty if either § 6662(d)(2)(C) 
or § 6662A applies to the position.  Id. 
220. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6694(a)(2)(C)(i) (West 2007) provides that the penalty will be imposed if 
―the position was not disclosed as provided in § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii),‖ which requires disclosure to the 
IRS on the face of the return or on a statement or form attached to the return.  26 U.S.C. § 
6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
221. Lee A. Sheppard, Diluting the Preparer Penalties by Regulation, 118 TAX NOTES 1213, 
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effect of these rules is that, contrary to the explicit intent of revised § 6694, 
the substantial authority standard appears to be the standard applicable to tax 
professionals.
222
  Congress has apparently recognized the problems with its 
amendments to § 6694 and, in the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum 
Tax Relief Act of 2008,
223
 modified the penalty standards yet again.  Under 
the most recent version of § 6694,
224
 a return preparer will not be liable for the 
penalty if there is substantial authority for the position or the position has a 
reasonable basis and is disclosed.
225
  Thus, the amendments appear to be 
consistent with Treasury‘s position in the proposed regulations.226 
D.  More Fundamental Issues 
While averting a conflict between the standards of more likely than not 
and substantial authority, the IRS Notices and proposed regulations 
underscore, but do not resolve, the two largest problems with the amendments 
to § 6694 and the proposed revisions of § 10.34: the shortcomings of the more 
likely than not standard and the problems attendant to disclosure. 
1.  More Likely Than Not, Not to Work 
While it is an improvement over the realistic possibility and reasonable 
basis standards, the more likely than not standard suffers from the same 
fundamental flaw as its predecessors.  Basing opinion standards on a ―chance 
of success‖ should a matter be litigated is in many, if not most, cases an 
exceedingly difficult determination, particularly in cases where the law is new 
or developing.  More troubling, it takes the focus off what I believe the real 
question tax advisors should be giving advice on—what does the law provide? 
Making a prediction on a chance of success in tax law is fraught with 
difficulties.  First, by looking at the chance of success should the matter be 
litigated, the focus is necessarily directed toward a hypothetical event, judicial 
review, which often has yet to occur.
227
  Yet, in making this determination, the 
tax advisor may not take into account that the matter may not be subject to 
 
1216–17 (2008). 
222. See id. at 1216. 
223. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).  The Tax Extenders and Alternative 
Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, along with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
and the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, was part of the massive financial bailout 
bill quickly passed by Congress in October 2008.    
224. The amendments generally apply to returns prepared after May 25, 2007.  Id. § 506(b). 
225. Id. § 506(a).  The more likely than not standard continues to apply to tax shelters.  Id.  
226. Given that these amendments to § 6694 occurred during the final production of this 
Article, a full analysis of these amendments is not possible.    
227. See Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertainty, 157 U. PENN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 19, on file with author). 
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audit.
228
  Given the low audit rates, the determination of success if the matter 
is litigated is necessarily specious, which plays into the cost-benefit analysis 
of, if not advisors, then certainly taxpayers.
229
  Moreover, as Professor Sarah 
Lawsky points out, a percentage chance of success, whether it be one in three 
or greater than fifty percent, cannot be determined based on the frequency 
with which it has succeeded.
230
  The standard is thus inherently disingenuous.  
For example, if a circuit court in the taxpayer‘s jurisdiction has upheld a 
position, then even if the numerous district court opinions in that circuit struck 
it down, the position is ―correct‖ in that circuit.  Thus, the more likely than not 
calculation cannot be made based solely on the number of times a position has 
succeeded or failed in litigation. 
In calculating the frequency with which a position is upheld, an advisor 
must also determine the cases with which the matter at issue should be 
compared.  This requires an advisor to determine whether the position in 
question is ―like‖ another position, which can be troubling given that the 
decisions on any tax issue tend to be highly fact-specific.  Thus, knowing that 
five out of ten ―similar‖ positions have been upheld does not tell us that there 
is a fifty-percent chance that this particular position will be upheld, nor that if 
the court looks at all ten of the positions on the taxpayer‘s return, it will find 
that five of them are correct.
231
  Most of the case law on gray-area tax issues 
provides at best only anecdotal evidence of how a court might rule and 
provides no real basis for an advisor to determine a chance of success.  The 
old saw that ―the plural of anecdote is not data‖ is especially apt here.232  In 
addition, the quality of the lawyering or whether the case was handled pro se 
in the Tax Court could well have impacted the court‘s decision, or the court‘s 
decision might be so fundamentally flawed as to be objectively ―wrong.‖233  
Thus, the fact that a court ruled against the position at issue may well not be 
the end of the inquiry.  Furthermore, with many newly concocted tax shelters, 
as well as legitimate but cutting-edge tax questions, neither the specific issue 
nor any issue similar to it may ever have been ruled on by a court. Thus, there 
would be no data, or even an anecdote, for an advisor to consider in 
determining a chance of success from a predictive perspective. 
The Treasury appears to be fully aware of the limitations of basing 
opinion standards on the chance of success, especially in relatively new areas 
of the law.  The proposed regulations under § 6694 provide that a ―tax return 
 
228. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(d)(1) (2007). 
229. Lawsky, supra note 227, at 13–14. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 16. 
232. See, e.g., Edith Greene, A Love-Hate Relationship, 18 JUST. SYS. J. 99, 100 (1995) (book 
review) (emphasis omitted). 
233. See Rowen, supra note 82, at 243. 
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preparer may reasonably believe that a position more likely than not would be 
sustained on its merits despite the absence of other types of authority if the 
position is supported by a well-reasoned construction of the applicable 
statutory provision.‖234  The Treasury has thus acknowledged that there will 
be cases in which an advisor cannot practicably determine whether a position 
meets a certain chance of success based on a comparison of existing 
authorities, but will instead base his or her opinion on an interpretation of the 
statute.  Professor Lawsky refers to this as a subjectivist interpretation of 
probability.
235
  Under this approach, the focus is not on the chance of success 
from a numerical point of view, but on the advisor‘s degree of belief in the 
position.
236
  Thus, while still focusing on a chance of success, the subjectivist 
interpretation acknowledged in the Treasury‘s position in section 1.6694-
2(b)(1) moves the inquiry away from what a court might decide based on a 
historical inquiry and closer to a focus on the rules themselves and the 
lawyer‘s opinion with respect to those rules.237 
This distinction was made by H.L.A. Hart, who provided a useful analogy 
in demonstrating the pitfalls of the predictive theory of law, i.e., ―the 
law . . . is what the courts say it is.‖238  Hart analogizes the law and judges‘ 
role in the law to a game of cricket or baseball played first without, and then 
with, an official scorer.
239
  Prior to the use of the scorer, the players all agree 
to the rules and more or less abide by those rules in resolving any disputes.
240
  
When an official scorer is inserted into the game, the scorer‘s decision is the 
final word on the application of the rules.
241
  Players can predict what the 
 
234. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1), 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560, 34,574 (June 17, 2008); see also 
I.R.S. Notice 2008-13, supra note 216, at 286 ex. 10. 
235. Lawsky, supra note 227, at 10–11. 
236. Id. 
237. It should be noted that the quoted portion of section 1.6694-2(b)(1) is only one sentence in 
a thirty-page set of regulations.  Other parts of the proposed regulations employ a decidedly 
frequentist or numerical interpretation of probability.  See, e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(4) 
ex. 4, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560, 34,574 (June 17, 2008).  Thus, it cannot be said that the Treasury has 
abandoned a numerical or frequentist approach to these questions. 
238. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141 (2d ed. 1994).  Falk noted his criticism of the 
realistic possibility of success standard when it was adopted in 1985: 
 
Legal realism—at least in the crude predictive version espoused by 
Holmes, Gray, Llewellyn, and Hughes—is the position that law is whatever a 
judge says it is. As a general theory of law, this predictive version of legal 
realism has been thoroughly discredited for over a generation. Yet Opinion 352 
defines the term ―good faith‖ in terms of this crude legal realism—i.e., the 
predicted result of adjudication. 
Falk, supra note 18, at 653–54 (footnotes omitted). 
239. HART, supra note 238, at 142. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. 
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scorer will do in a given situation, but these are merely unofficial statements 
as to what the scorer will officially decide.
242
  The players can predict what 
the scorer‘s ruling will be because they know and have used the rules, and 
because the scorer will, in the vast majority of the cases, follow the rules.
243
  
While the scorer could in theory make any ruling he or she wished, if the rules 
are disregarded too frequently, the game ceases to be cricket or baseball and 
becomes the game of ―scorer‘s discretion.‖244  Applying this analogy to law, 
judges have considerably more discretion than official scorers in a game, but 
they nevertheless are bound by laws, constitutions, and rules.
245
  Hart argues: 
 
Such standards could not indeed continue to exist unless most 
of the judges of the time adhered to them, for their existence 
at any given time consists simply in the acceptance and use of 
them as standards of correct adjudication.  But this does not 
make the judge who uses them the author of these 
standards . . . . 
 
. . . .  
 
. . . [P]redictions of what a court will do are like the 
prediction we might make that chess-players will move the 
bishop diagonally: they rest ultimately on an appreciation of 
the non-predictive aspect of rules, and of the internal point of 
view of the rules as standards accepted by those to whom the 
predictions relate.
246
 
 
In determining whether a position on a tax return meets the more likely 
than not standard, advisors are asked to predict how a court will ultimately 
rule.  Thus, it is the rule, not what the judge determines it to be, that should be 
controlling.  As Theodore Falk noted in his criticism of ABA Formal Opinion 
85-352: ―Whether one can in good faith believe in the lawfulness of a position 
is not the same as predicting that the courts will adopt it. Rather, a position is 
lawful if the courts ought to adopt it.‖247 
Moreover, for purposes of taxpayers‘ reliance defense, it is the mere 
saying of the phrase ―more likely than not‖ by the tax professional that makes 
 
242. Id. at 143. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 142. 
245. Id. at 145. 
246. Id. at 145, 147. 
247. Falk, supra note 18, at 655.  According to Falk, the purpose of the standard should be to 
―improve lawyers‘ arguments, not their footnotes.‖  Id. at 657. 
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it so.  If a lawyer or accountant advises a taxpayer that a position has a more 
likely than not chance of success, then, at least as to that taxpayer and that tax 
position, the position does meet that standard, since taxpayers are generally 
allowed to rely on the advice of tax experts.
248
  While predicting whether 
something has a certain chance of success is in most cases difficult if not 
impossible to calculate, by the same token, proving that a position does not 
meet that chance of success standard is equally difficult to prove, especially in 
the context of negligence penalties.  Thus, under the predictive standards as 
applied to tax law, the more likely than not standard turns legal realism on its 
head by making the law what the lawyer says it is, since, for purposes of the 
reliance defense, the lawyer‘s determination that a position meets the more 
likely than not standard makes it so.  Accordingly, basing the standard for tax 
advice on a chance of success is both unrealistic and ripe for abuse.  The 
standard should be based on what the lawyer believes the law is.  Focusing on 
the law itself, rather than on some mythical chance of success, more properly 
emphasizes the role of tax advisors and puts the responsibility squarely on 
advisors‘ shoulders. 
2.  Disclosure 
The second fundamental problem with the new tax advice rules is related 
to the issues of disclosure.  Those return positions that do not meet, or cannot 
definitively be said to have met, either the more likely than not standard or the 
substantial authority standard must be disclosed.  Notice 2008-14 outlines the 
nuts-and-bolts procedures for how a taxpayer is to disclose a position.  
However, neither the Notice nor any other guidance informs taxpayers or their 
advisors as to how much information must be disclosed for it to be a sufficient 
disclosure to avoid penalties.
249
  A simple example might prove useful: 
Suppose you are advising clients, Dr. and Dr. Smith, who are both physicians. 
In addition to their downtown condo, the Smiths own a pied-de-terre to which 
they repair each weekend. They raise and train horses on the farm, and their 
plan is to sell horses at some point and make a profit. This year, as with each 
year in the past, the farm has lost money. The Smiths would like to claim an 
ordinary business loss deduction on their Form 1040 for the farm and ask your 
advice. During the course of the many conversations you have had with the 
Smiths, you learn that they have three teenage daughters, each of whom is 
 
248. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2007). 
249. For example, Treasury Regulation section 1.6662-4(f)(1) merely provides:  ―Disclosure is 
adequate with respect to an item . . . if the disclosure is made on a properly completed form attached 
to the return . . . .‖  The regulations do not define or explain what amount of disclosure is ―adequate.‖  
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(f)(1) (2007).  The Revenue Procedures in this area suffer from the same lack 
of specificity.  See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2001-52, 2001-46 I.R.B. 491. 
2008] “PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM” AND TAX SHELTERS 71 
crazy about horses and riding. While the clients hope to sell the horses they 
are raising, their daughters are resisting any effort to sell ―their pets.‖ 
This, of course, is the classic hobby loss scenario.  Given the law in this 
area, it would be difficult to determine that the Smiths have a more likely than 
not chance of succeeding on the hobby loss issue, and a disclosure would be 
necessary.
250
  If they claim a loss from the horse farm, what must be disclosed 
in order for the disclosure to be sufficient?  Must the taxpayers disclose that it 
is a potential hobby loss, that their children ride the horses, that the farm has 
lost money each year, or that their daughters consider the horses to be pets 
and not inventory?  Those taxpayers and their advisors who want to make 
adequate disclosures but not raise unnecessary red flags are given little 
guidance in the new disclose-everything regime. 
Beyond the practical difficulties with disclosure for those taxpayers and 
their advisors who want to make sufficient disclosure, there is also a risk that 
the disclosure regime will become the refuge of the knaves and villains much 
in the way the tax shelter opinion itself was in the 1990s.  First, for those 
members of the tax bar who wish to conceal their knavery, the disclosure 
statement will permit them to act as if they are complying, but without 
providing truly helpful information.
251
  The carefully-worded-but-eminently-
misleading disclosure statement will therefore become more about deceiving 
the IRS than actually disclosing anything.  The other risk is that the new 
strategy will be to disclose everything regardless of whether the position is 
settled or not.  In some cases, over-disclosure will be made out of an excess of 
caution, and there is little to be lost in disclosing transactions that the IRS will 
ultimately bless.
252
  But the bar is also capable of flooding the government 
with paper, thereby making it all the more difficult for the government to find 
the truly useful disclosure. As Professor David Schizer noted, ―[t]here is no 
penalty . . . for adding hay to the haystack, in order to make the needle harder 
to find.‖253  With already low audit rates, the IRS simply does not have the 
staffing to deal with the torrent of disclosure statements that may occur.
254
 
Moreover, as Professor Boris Bittker noted a generation ago, Congress 
should not fall back on the requirement of disclosure to resolve the 
ambiguities inherent in the tax code.
255
  The IRS is fully capable, given its 
blanket authority to prescribe the forms taxpayers must use, of specifying the 
 
250. See, e.g., Osteen v. Comm‘r, 62 F.3d 356, 358 (11th Cir. 1995). 
251. Schizer, supra note 8, at 369. 
252. Overreaction by the tax bar was indeed the response to the covered opinion rules.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 160–62. 
253. Schizer, supra note 8, at 370. 
254. See id. at 331–32. 
255. Boris I. Bittker, Professional Responsibility and Federal Tax Practice, reprinted in 
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 233, 255 (Boris Bittker ed., 1970). 
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items that are frequently debatable, and ―the Internal Revenue Service ought 
not to depend on a vague concept of taxpayer disclosure for debatable items 
and transactions.‖256  The Treasury has lessened the impact of Congress‘s 
disclosure mandate in the proposed regulations under § 6694 by allowing, in 
essence, disclosure to the client.  However, it is unclear whether Congress will 
permit this emasculating of the preparer penalties to stand, and also whether 
Congress will insist on full disclosure to the IRS of questionable positions.
257
 
Finally, if disclosure does become the new default position for taxpayers 
and their advisors, this propensity to disclose could have serious implications 
for the attorney-client privilege in tax advice.  The reach and contours of the 
attorney-client privilege in tax matters is murky at best, with some courts 
holding that return advice is not subject to the privilege.
258
  What is evident, 
however, is that when a position is disclosed on a return, the privilege is 
waived.
259
  Thus, by establishing a system in which disclosure is more or less 
compelled, Congress and the Treasury are essentially requiring taxpayers to 
waive the attorney-client privilege in many instances.  While I do not believe 
Congress‘s nudging toward more disclosure is part of a concerted effort to 
undermine the attorney-client privilege,
260
 it may, nevertheless, be an 
unintended consequence. 
Accordingly, as with the covered opinion rules in which the arcane 
provisions begat disclaimers rather than advice, the amendments to § 6694, 
which could result in the imposition of substantial penalties and the waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege, will mean that fewer taxpayers are given useful 
tax advice.  As discussed above, this result is antithetical to sound tax 
administration.
261
 
IV.  TOWARD A MORE BENEFICIAL STANDARD FOR TAX ADVICE 
While it is tempting to remain on the sidelines and merely jeer at those in 
the game, in this part, I will set forth what I believe to be a better, more 
straightforward, standard for tax advice.  I start with the premise that whatever 
rules or standards are adopted, the rules or standards should both make tax 
 
256. Id. 
257. Disclosure has been one of the mainstays of Congress‘s efforts to combat tax shelters.  
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 6011(a), 6707A(a) (2000).  It is therefore likely that Congress will continue to 
require real disclosure. 
258. E.g., United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 500–01 (7th Cir. 1999);  United States v. 
KPMG, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C. 2002). 
259. See 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§  2292–2320 
(1961). 
260. But see United States v. Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 154–55 (D.R.I. 2007) (refusing 
to enforce IRS summons for tax accrual work papers). 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 169–72. 
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shelters and other abusive transactions more difficult and facilitate legitimate 
tax advice and legitimate tax planning.
262
  While tax shelters need to be dealt 
with, and I have no quarrel with going after shelter promoters, investors, and 
the professionals who advise them, the vast majority of taxpayers are simply 
trying to navigate their way through the system and the vast majority of tax 
professionals are just trying to find the right answer.  The tax advice rules 
should not be geared only toward stopping the bad actors, thereby making 
legitimate tax advice more difficult.  Rather, given the complexity of tax law 
and the ubiquitous nature of taxes, an effective tax system requires that 
knowledgeable tax professionals properly advise their clients.  The recent 
actions by Congress and the Treasury get in the way of professionals 
providing this advice.  Thus, the new provisions threaten to create an 
environment where taxpayers are less well-advised and the only taxpayers and 
professionals who do any type of planning or receive any kind of advice are 
those with the highest risk tolerance.  This is not good for anyone.
263
 
So where should we go from here?  We cannot return to the status quo 
ante of realistic possibility of success or the wild-west days of the pre-
reasonable basis era.  History has shown that those standards are unworkable 
and many of the criticisms leveled against the recent amendments can be 
aimed even more pointedly at the prior standards.  It would also be naïve to 
think that policy makers would lower standards in the face of the tax shelter 
problem.
264
 
An antecedent inquiry is whether the new canon should be a rule or a 
standard.  As Brian Galle has noted, the tax academy has arrived rather late to 
the rules-versus-standards debate and interpretive theory,
265
 but much has 
been written outside the tax literature on the efficacy of adopting a rule or set 
of rules to deal with specific issues as opposed to a standard of more general 
application.
266
  Resolving this rich debate is far beyond the scope of this 
 
262. See Weisbach, supra note 6, at 222. 
263. As Lester Thurow stated: 
 
No modern tax system or society can work without honest voluntary 
compliance and cooperation from nearly all of its citizens. . . . The Internal 
Revenue Service can collect taxes from the dishonest few, but it cannot collect 
taxes from a dishonest majority or even a large minority. When everyone begins 
to feel that he is a ―sucker‖ if he pays taxes, it is only a matter of time until the 
tax system collapses. America is close to this point. 
Lester C. Thurow, The Dishonest Economy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 21, 1985, at 35. 
264. As Austin Powers so eloquently stated, ―That train has sailed.‖  AUSTIN POWERS: THE 
SPY WHO SHAGGED ME (New Line Cinema 1999). 
265. Galle, supra note 1, at 358. 
266. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 
65–66 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
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Article.  Without diminishing the distinctions, I do not believe that in our 
context it is an either-or question.  Rules certainly have had a salutary impact 
on shelters in the past.  The enactment of the passive activity loss and at-risk 
rules essentially shut down the shelter industry that thrived in the 1970s and 
early 1980s.
267
  However, as Professors Marvin A. Chirelstein and Lawrence 
A. Zelenak point out, narrowly tailored legislative responses to particular 
types of shelters are not an adequate solution to the shelter problem overall.
268
  
While many rules do indeed close loopholes, they also create a fixed target at 
which tax lawyers may then aim.  Perhaps the best example of this is the use 
of the anti-Logan installment sales regulations by the taxpayer in ACM 
Partnership v. Commissioner.
269
  Moreover, any rules adopted would be 
prospective in application and, like the adage applied to generals, Congress is 
always fighting the last tax shelter war.  It simply cannot keep up.
270
  Thus, 
while rules do have their place, standards must be used to fill the gap. 
More importantly, rules designed to thwart tax shelters are only designed 
to do just that—stop shelters.  They offer little in the way of defining 
legitimate tax advice.  Indeed, as discussed at length above, a key problem 
with the recent anti-shelter initiatives is that they make legitimate tax planning 
more difficult.  Thus, the standard or rule must promote legitimate tax advice 
while deterring abusive transactions.  Standards, because of their more general 
application, are better at this. 
A.  The Statute is the Thing 
In formulating an appropriate standard for return advice, one must first 
take into account the nature of the tax return, i.e., what it is that a return is 
supposed to do.  While there are other views of what a tax return is designed 
to accomplish,
 
our tax system has been based primarily on what Professor 
 
REV. 1685, 1706 (1976); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 398 (1985); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62 
(1992). 
267. See 26 U.S.C. § 465 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 26 U.S.C. § 469 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
268. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1953.  Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak‘s 
proposal to combat tax shelters is to have Congress enact a Code provision disallowing all 
noneconomic losses.  Id. at 1952.  Other scholars have offered other solutions to the tax shelter 
problem in recent years.  See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 59–60; Schler, supra note 
1, at 367–83; Alexandra M. Walsh, Formally Legal, Probably Wrong: Corporate Tax Shelters, 
Practical Reason and the New Textualism, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1541, 1545–46 (2001).  Each of these 
solutions has merit; however, a full discussion and dissection of these proposals is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
269. 157 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1998).  The taxpayer in ACM Partnership used regulations 
designed to prevent accelerated recovery of basis in an installment sale, known as the anti-Logan 
installment sales regulations, to devise an elegant, and nearly successful, tax avoidance scheme.  See 
generally id. 
270. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1953. 
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Bittker refers to as the ―honest-belief approach.‖271  Returns are signed under 
penalty of perjury that they are true, correct, and complete to the best of the 
taxpayer‘s knowledge.  Thus, tax returns are viewed as expressing taxpayers‘ 
opinions of their liability under the tax laws, and taxpayers discharge this 
obligation to the government by expressing this opinion honestly.
272
  The 
negligence penalty and the relief from that penalty has, since 1918, been 
based on the idea that taxpayers may have an honest disagreement with the 
government as to the meaning of certain Code provisions, and that taxpayers 
should not be punished for such an honest disagreement.
273
  Finally, and 
perhaps most important to our inquiry into tax advisor standards, the reliance 
defense to the accuracy-related and fraud penalties is premised on the idea 
that taxpayers may reasonably rely on the advice of experts in attempting to 
discharge their obligations under the law.
274
 
If tax returns are indeed the honest attempts of taxpayers to report their 
income and expenses, tax advisors may only satisfy their role in the system by 
helping their clients meet that obligation.
275
  The reliance-on-counsel defense 
is based on the premise that tax law is unknowable to most mortals and that 
taxpayers may utilize experts with more knowledge of the law to help them 
satisfy their obligations under the law.  It is not a license to be more 
aggressive, nor is the defense designed to provide lucrative incomes to 
lawyers and accountants.  Thus, the role of advisors is to assist their clients in 
honestly reporting income and deductions.
276
  Advisors will disagree about the 
 
271. Bittker, supra note 255, at 254. 
272. Rowen, supra note 82, at 250. 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 60–72. 
274. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (2007). 
275. See Falk, supra note 18, at 660. 
 
Whether he is a tax cheater or Justice Holmes, the taxpayer seeks the 
attorney‘s advice about what tax law requires. When tax law is uncertain, the 
attorney‘s advice will concern legal risks and depend on the client‘s attitude. 
Some clients are aggressive, others conservative, and others leave it to the 
attorney to decide what risks to take. But uncertainty in the law—a condition 
hardly unique to tax law—does not alter the attorney‘s basic advising function. 
The attorney advisor tells the client what it takes to comply with the law. 
Id. 
276. Returning again to first principles, Canon 32 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which 
were adopted by the ABA in 1908, provides: 
 
[The lawyer] must also observe and advise his client to observe the statut[ory] 
law, though until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by 
competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise as to its validity and as 
to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent.  
ABA Comm. on Code of Prof‘l Ethics, Final Rep. (1908). Thus, Canon 32 does not dictate that 
lawyers make whatever arguments they deem reasonable or arguable, but rather to advise as to what 
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meaning of words and phrases.  However, in dealing with ambiguous 
provisions in the Code, taxpayers and their advisors must attempt to discern 
what Congress meant in enacting a given provision.
277
  This in turn requires 
the advisor to focus on the language of the statute at issue.  The practice of 
law, including tax law, is fundamentally the practice of statutory 
interpretation, and the tax advice standard should require advisors to focus on 
the language of the Code.
278
 
The risk of basing the tax advice standard on the text itself is, of course, 
that such a formulation will only play into the hands of the hyper-textualists 
who have been the cause of the current plague of shelters and other abusive 
transactions.
279
  After all, the courts have dealt with many of these shelters 
using a broad economic substance or business purpose doctrine.  These tests 
are needed, so the argument goes, to override the tendency of lawyers and 
accountants to view the Code in isolation.  In the next section, I will show that 
the economic substance and business purpose doctrines have drifted far from 
their original moorings and that the true focus of those doctrines is consistent 
with my proposed standard that focuses on the language and purpose of the 
statute at issue.  Moreover, the economic substance and business purpose tests 
have only clouded the inquiry and often offer little to the analysis of whether a 
transaction is proper.
280
  I will analyze the economic substance test in the 
context of the British House of Lords‘ recent opinion in MacNiven v. 
Westmoreland Investments Ltd.,
281
 which rejected a broad-based economic 
 
they conscientiously believe the statute‘s meaning to be.  Rowen, supra note 82, at 246. 
277. Falk, supra note 18, at 658 (―In the debate over Proposed Opinion 314 Revision, both 
sides ‗did not question the desirability of congruence between the minimum ethical and penalty 
standards.‘  Yet, it can only confuse matters to treat the attorney‘s ethical obligation as requiring 
something other than advice on compliance with the law.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
278. Galle, supra note 1, at 358. 
279. See, e.g., Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 4. 
 
Under the textualist approach, it is much easier for an attorney to write a 
favorable opinion for transactions that are designed to comply with the letter of 
the law, but not its spirit, for at least two reasons.  First, the attorney is 
permitted to ignore, or at least downplay, any legislative history that would 
argue against, or undercut, the desired tax results.  Second, under a textualist 
approach, it is arguable that various well-accepted judicial doctrines, such as the 
business purpose doctrine, are suspect.  At the extreme, a textualist might argue 
that these doctrines are the product of judicial activism and either should no 
longer be followed, or at a minimum should not be extended into new areas of 
the law. 
Id.  Cunningham and Repetti blame the ascendancy of textualism for the recent tax shelter crisis.  Id. 
280. Cf. Percy H. Winfield, Ethics in English Case Law, 45 HARV. L. REV. 112, 115 (1931) 
(quoting Lord Justice Bowen‘s statement that the state of ―a man‘s mind is as much an ascertainable 
fact as the state of his digestion‖). 
281. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 29 (UKHC). 
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substance doctrine in favor of a standard that examines the meaning of the 
statute and intent of the legislator. 
B.  MacNiven v. Westmoreland 
As economic substance cases go, the transaction in MacNiven was quite 
straightforward.
282
  The issue in MacNiven was whether an interest deduction 
should be allowed on amounts paid from a subsidiary to its parent.
283
  The 
taxpayer, Westmoreland Investments Ltd., owed the trustees of its parent, the 
Electricity Supply Pension Scheme, over £70 million, including more than 
£40 million in accrued interest.
284
  Westmoreland‘s liabilities greatly exceeded 
its assets, and all the liabilities were owed to the trustees.
285
  Given this rather 
bleak balance sheet, Westmoreland was valueless with no great expectations 
of a turnaround, and it would have a dickens of a time finding a buyer.
286
  But 
Westmoreland did have one potential asset, which ironically was also its 
biggest liability—its substantial accrued interest liability.287  Under section 
338 of the United Kingdom‘s Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, 
―payments of interest, other than interest on bank loans, may be set against 
profits, and any unused excess may be carried forward under section 75 of the 
Taxes Act 1988.‖288  Thus, if Westmoreland could pay the pension scheme 
trustees the £40 million of interest it owed, it would have value as a company 
with substantial established tax losses.
289
  A purchaser could then transfer 
income-producing assets to Westmoreland and take advantage of the losses to 
offset any future profits.
290
 
But first Westmoreland had to pay the interest it owed to the trustees of 
the pension scheme.
291
 Westmoreland was obviously unable to make any 
payments out of its own resources, and no bank or other third party was likely 
to loan it the £40 million necessary.
292
  As a result, the trustees of the pension 
scheme itself lent the money to Westmoreland, which then used the funds to 
pay off its interest liability, claiming an interest deduction for the amount 
paid.
293
  Significant to the House of Lords‘ opinion, the initial trier of fact 
 
282. Compare ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F. 3d 231, 239–42 (3d Cir. 1998). 
283. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 19. 
284. Id. ¶ 9.  The word ―scheme‖ does not appear to be used in the pejorative American sense.  
285. Id.   
286. Id. ¶ 10. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. ¶ 11. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. 
78 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [92:33 
found ―that the steps involved in these transactions were genuine,‖ and there 
was no allegation that any of the steps were shams.
294
 
The case ultimately came before the House of Lords on the issue of 
whether the interest deduction claimed by Westmoreland should be 
allowed.
295
  The government‘s position was that the amounts paid by 
Westmoreland did not constitute ―payments‖ within the meaning of section 
338 because the payments had no commercial purpose, were purely for the 
purpose of avoiding tax, and therefore fell within the Ramsay principle.
296
  
The Ramsay principle, from W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Inland Revenue 
Commissioners,
297
 is the House of Lords‘ iteration of the economic substance 
and business purpose doctrines.
298
  The position of Westmoreland was that the 
payments made to the trustees of the pension scheme were legitimate 
transactions that met the definition of ―payment‖ within the meaning of the 
statute.
299
  The House of Lords was therefore required to determine whether 
transactions that meet the terms of the statute, but which may have no 
apparent commercial purpose, should be respected for tax purposes.
300
 
Giving the main speech for the House was Lord Hoffmann, who began by 
rejecting the Crown‘s broad application of the Ramsay principle.301  Finding 
that the Ramsay principal was being applied as ―an overriding legal principle, 
superimposed upon the whole of revenue law without regard to the language 
or purpose of any particular provision,‖ Lord Hoffmann held that there is 
―ultimately only one principle of construction, namely to ascertain what 
Parliament meant by using the language of the statute.‖ 302 
 
294. Id. ¶ 12. 
295. Id. ¶ 19. 
296. Id. ¶ 27. 
297. [1982] A.C. 300 (H.L.). 
298. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶¶ 30–32.  Notably, the Ramsay principle traces its lineage to the 
opinion of Judge Hand in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1934).  See infra text 
accompanying notes 313–17. 
299. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 19. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. ¶ 28–29. 
302. Id. ¶ 29.  It is fair to say that the U.S. courts‘ usage and treatment of the economic 
substance, business purpose, and sham transaction doctrines have not been consistent.  A complete 
treatment of these doctrines in the U.S. courts is well beyond the scope of this Article.  For an 
excellent summary of these cases, see Leland Gardner, An Elephant in the Room: Double Deductions 
and the Economic Substance Doctrine in Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 60 TAX LAW. 519 
(2007).  As Gardner explains,  the courts of appeals use essentially three approaches in analyzing 
transactions. ―Some circuits apply a conjunctive test: a transaction must satisfy both the business 
purpose and the economic substance inquiries.‖  Id. at 525–26.  See, e.g., Illes v. Comm‘r, 982 F.2d 
163, 165 (6th Cir. 1992);  Shriver v. Comm‘r, 899 F.2d 724, 725–26 (8th Cir. 1990); Rice‘s Toyota 
World, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 752 F.2d 89, 91 (4th Cir. 1985).  Other circuits use a disjunctive test and 
consider each of the tests independently and may disregard a transaction if it lacks either a business 
purpose or economic substance.  See, e.g., Nicole Rose Corp. v. Comm‘r, 320 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 
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Lord Hoffmann began his support of this form of textualism, which he has 
referred to as the ―purposive approach,‖ with the idea that words and phrases 
used in the law, particularly freestanding codes like the income tax, have their 
own independent meaning.
303
  For example, when an economist says that 
―real‖ income has fallen, the economist is not intending to contrast real 
incomes with imaginary ones.
304
  Rather, the comparison is between incomes 
that have been adjusted for inflation and those that have not.  Thus, in order to 
know what an economist means by ―real,‖ one must first identify what Lord 
Hoffmann referred to as the ―relevant concept‖ (in this example, inflation 
adjustment) by reference to which speaker is using the word.
305
 
Lord Hoffmann then pointed out that tax statutes often use terms and refer 
to purely legal concepts that have no meaning (or at least a different meaning) 
outside the tax laws.
306
  For example, the term ―basis‖ is a term of common 
understanding in tax law, but its tax definition only has meaning in the unique 
world of tax law.
307
  In viewing these statutes, one must examine them within 
the relevant concept of the particular Code provision and statutory schema.
308
 
 
2002); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm‘r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2001); ASA Investerings 
P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 201 F.3d 505, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  And other circuits apply a unitary test 
considering business purpose and economic substance as factors to inform a sham transaction 
analysis.  See, e.g., ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 157 F.3d 231, 246 n.29 (3d Cir. 1998); Casebeer v. 
Comm‘r, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990); James v. Comm‘r, 899 F.2d 905, 908–09 (10th Cir. 
1990).  In addition to three different approaches, courts have also applied the tests in numerous, 
mind-numbing ways.  Some courts apply a pro-taxpayer presumption, where the transaction will be 
allowable if it possesses either a business purpose or economic substance.  See, e.g., Black & Decker 
Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 440 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 127 
(3d Cir. 1994).  Other courts apply the opposite presumption: the transaction will be disallowable if it 
lacks either a business purpose or economic substance.  See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp., 436 F.3d at 
440; Wexler, 31 F.3d at 127.  Moreover, some courts have conflated the economic substance doctrine 
with the sham transaction doctrine.  See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp., 436 F.3d at 440; Wexler, 31 
F.3d at 127. 
303. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶¶ 40–46. 
304. Id. ¶ 40. 
305. Id. ¶ 58.  This approach is consistent with modern textualist interpretation, which holds 
that language only has meaning in context.  Modern textualists therefore often resort to extrastatutory 
contextual clues.  See, e.g., Manning, supra note 14, at 75–76. 
306. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 58. 
307. 26 U.S.C.A. § 1016 (West 2007).  Lord Hoffmann used the example of whether a stamp 
duty is payable upon a ―conveyance or transfer on sale‖ pursuant to Schedule 13, paragraph 1(1) to 
the Finance Act 1999.  MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 58.  ―[T]he statutory language defines the document 
subject to duty essentially by reference to external legal concepts such as ‗conveyance‘ and ‗sale.‘‖ 
Id. 
308. As Professor Manning points out, modern textualism is thus consistent with 
Wittgenstein‘s insights about language.  Manning, supra note 14, at 79 n.29 (quoting Cont‘l Can Co. 
v. Chi. Truck Drivers, 916 F.2d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 1990) (―You don‘t have to be Ludwig 
Wittgenstein or Hans-Georg Gadamer to know that successful communication depends on meanings 
shared by interpretive communities.‖); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
§§ 134–42 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958) (emphasizing ―the use of words in linguistic 
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Lord Hoffmann then addressed whether general principles like the 
Ramsay principle could be used to decide whether the taxpayer‘s actions 
constituted acceptable tax mitigation or unacceptable tax avoidance.
309
  Lord 
Hoffmann held that when the statutory provisions at issue do not contain 
words like ―avoidance‖ or ―mitigation,‖ it does not help to introduce them.310  
Thus, whether steps that are taken for the avoidance of tax are acceptable or 
unacceptable is the conclusion at which one arrives by applying the statutory 
language to the facts of the case, rather than a test for deciding whether the 
statute applies or not.
311
  Lord Hoffmann argued that it does not promote 
―clarity of thought‖ to use terms like ―stratagem or device.‖312  Transactions 
either work or they do not. 
 
If they do not work, the reason . . . is simply that upon the 
true construction of the statute, the transaction which was 
designed to avoid the charge to tax actually comes within it.  
It is not that the statute has a penumbral spirit which strikes 
down devices or stratagems designed to avoid its terms or 
exploit its loopholes.
313
 
 
The House of Lords therefore allowed the deduction.
314
 
MacNiven thus stands for the proposition that in evaluating the reach of a 
statute, one must employ a ―purposive approach‖ to determine the nature of 
the transaction to which it was intended to apply and then to decide whether 
the actual transaction (which might involve considering the overall effect of a 
number of elements intended to operate together) answers to the statutory 
description.  This means that the question is always whether the relevant 
 
interactions within the relevant community‖)). 
309. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 58. 
310. Id. ¶ 62. 
311. Id.; see also PAUL, supra note 5, at 91–92. 
 
In the field of tax avoidance there is special need to be distrustful of glib rules 
of thumb and formulae masquerading as authoritative general principles—
special need because the general propositions commonly employed in the 
subject are so broad and have such an elastic vocabulary.  Words like ―reality,‖ 
―fiction,‖ ―essence,‖ ―form,‖ and ―substance‖ have little displacement, and 
usually mean little more than what is desired for the occasion.  They are 
amorphous, question-begging words without fixed content, and their chief 
function is to make an unsure conclusion sound well. 
PAUL, supra note 5, at 90–91 (footnotes omitted). 
312. MacNiven, 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 62. 
313. Id. ¶ 62 (quoting Norglen Ltd. v. Reeds Rains Prudential Ltd. [1999] 2 A.C. 1, 13–14 
(H.L.)) (citations omitted). 
314. Id. ¶ 74. 
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provision of the statute, upon its true construction, applies to the facts of a 
particular case.
315
 
In an article published in the British Tax Review,
316
 Lord Hoffmann 
explains that the ―purposive construction‖ he applied to tax statutes in 
MacNiven had as its origin Judge Hand‘s opinion in Helvering v. Gregory.317  
The irony of using the source of the economic substance and business purpose 
doctrines to overturn a broad economic substance doctrine was not lost on 
Lord Hoffmann, who used the genesis of those doctrines as part of his call to 
return the focus to the statute.  Quoting at length from Judge Hand‘s opinion 
in Gregory, in which Judge Hand finds that Ms. Gregory‘s plan for a 
corporate reorganization
318
 was not entitled to tax free treatment because her 
artificial scheme was ―not what the statute means by a ‗reorganization,‘‖ Lord 
Hoffmann argues that Judge Hand‘s decision is based on statutory 
construction and not some overriding business purpose doctrine.
319
  According 
 
315. Id. ¶ 8 (Nicholls of Birkenhead, L.J.). 
316. Leonard Hoffmann, Tax Avoidance, 2 B.T.R. 197 (2005). 
317. See id. at 197–99.  Lord Hoffmann has also applied this purposive construction to patent 
disputes.  See, e.g., Kirin-Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd. [2004] UKHL 46, [2005] 1 All 
E.R. 667 (UKHL) (Hoffmann, L.J.). 
 
―Purposive construction‖ does not mean that one is extending or going beyond 
the definition of the technical matter for which the patentee seeks protection in 
the claims.  The question is always what the person skilled in the art would have 
understood the patentee to be using the language of the claim to mean.  And for 
this purpose, the language he has chosen is usually of critical importance. 
Id. ¶ 34. 
318. In Gregory, the taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a corporation holding appreciated 
shares of a subsidiary corporation.  In an attempt to distribute these appreciated shares to herself 
without the transaction being taxed as a dividend, the taxpayer organized a new corporation, 
transferred the shares to the new corporation, and immediately dissolved the new corporation.  As the 
sole shareholder of the new corporation, Gregory received the shares.  Gregory then sold the shares 
and paid tax on the proceeds at the capital gain rate.  Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 
1934). 
319. Hoffmann, supra note 316, at 197–98. Lord Hoffmann quoted the following language 
from Judge Hand‘s opinion: 
 
If what was done here was what was intended by [the statute], it is of no 
consequence that it was all an elaborate scheme to get rid of income tax, as it 
certainly was. . . . [But] the purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged 
in enterprises . . . might wish to consolidate, or divide, to add to, or subtract 
from, their holdings. Such transactions were not to be considered as realizing 
any profit, because the collective interests still remained in solution. But the 
underlying presupposition is plain that the readjustment shall be undertaken for 
reasons germane to the conduct of the venture in hand, not as an ephemeral 
incident, egregious to its prosecution . . . .  We cannot treat as inoperative the 
transfer of shares . . . .  The transfer passed title . . . and the taxpayer became a 
shareholder in the transferee. All these steps were real and their only defect was 
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to Lord Hoffmann, the reorganization in Gregory was not given tax-free 
treatment because the concept of a ―plan of reorgani[z]ation‖ in the statute 
contemplates doing something for a business purpose and not solely to avoid 
tax.
320
  Thus, the requirement of a business purpose was dictated by the statute 
itself, and Judge Hand did not apply any rule taken from outside the statute. 
Gregory cannot, according to Lord Hoffmann, be read to hold that 
whatever the provisions of a statute might be, a transaction that has no 
business purpose will not be respected for tax purposes.
321
  As discussed 
above, there are too many instances in the Code in which transactions entered 
into solely for tax purposes are respected for there to be any real viability to 
such a broad application of the rule.
322
  Lord Hoffmann asserts that tax 
avoidance should be a contradiction in terms, if by tax avoidance we mean 
transactions successfully structured to avoid a tax that the legislature intended 
to impose.
323
  The only way in which a legislature can express an intention to 
impose a tax is by a statute that imposes such a tax.
324
 
Lord Hoffmann asserts that he is applying a ―purposive construction‖ to a 
text.
325
  However, while styling himself as a purposivist, Lord Hoffmann is, in 
reality, a modern textualist.  In his recent article, What Divides Textualists 
from Purposivists?,
326
 Professor John Manning discusses the common ground, 
as well as the differences between purposivists and textualists.  Professor 
Manning argues that purposivists from the legal process tradition believe that 
it is unrealistic to believe ―that Congress collectively knows or cares about the 
semantic detail of often complex statutes.‖327  For purposivists, enforcing the 
purpose or policy of a statute, rather than the minutiae of its semantic detail, 
better serves the legislative supremacy that they argue textualists are trying to 
defend.
328
  Professor Manning argues that in contrast, textualists believe that 
the purposivist approach ignores the legislative compromise that created the 
particular text at issue.
329
  Textualists assert that legislative supremacy is best 
served by ―attributing to legislators the understanding that a reasonable person 
conversant with applicable conventions would attach to the enacted text in 
 
that they were not what the statute means by a ‗reorganisation‘ [sic].  
Id. at 197–98 (quoting Gregory, 69 F.2d at 810–11). 
320. Id. at 198. 
321. Id. at 199. 
322. See supra note 11. 
323. Hoffman, supra note 316, at 206. 
324. See id. 
325. Id. 
326. Manning, supra note 14, at 70. 
327. Id. at 91. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. at 92. 
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context.‖330  Textualists point out that purposivism cannot deal adequately 
with legislative compromise because semantic detail, in the end, is the only 
way legislators can actually set forth the agreed-upon legislative 
compromise.
331
  Despite the significant differences, recent scholarship has 
recognized the common ground among modern textualism and modern 
purposivism.
332
  Modern textualists are cognizant of context as well as text, 
while modern purposivists give great weight to statutory text.
333
 
Given the common ground, what differentiates modern purposivists and 
textualists is that purposivists will give deference to the policy concerns 
underlying the legislative choice, even when those policies are contrary to the 
language of the text.
334
  It is in this vein that Lord Hoffmann and his opinion 
in MacNiven part company with the purposivists.  The problem with using 
policies like business purpose or economic substance is that these are not 
consistent policies throughout the Code.
335
  As indicated, there are numerous 
instances in which transactions entered into solely for tax purposes are 
perfectly acceptable and no business purpose is required for those positions to 
be upheld.
336
  To paraphrase Lord Hoffmann, one cannot superimpose the 
economic substance and business purposes as overriding legal principles upon 
the whole Internal Revenue Code without regard to the language or purpose of 
any particular provision.
337
 
Thus, Lord Hoffmann‘s purposive construction is in reality textualism in 
which one looks at the purpose or policy behind the particular statute at issue, 
rather than some overarching policy permeating the entire Code.  Given the 
capricious use of the economic substance doctrines, MacNiven is a clearer 
treatment of shelters and provides a more principled basis for evaluating 
whether a transaction is legitimate tax planning or an abusive tax shelter.  The 
purposivist construction of MacNiven provides a real service to tax analysis: 
 
330. Id. 
331. Id. 
332. Id. at 75 (citing Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re 
Speaking?”  Why Intention Free Interpretation is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 974–
78 (2004) (arguing that textualism is, at root, a form of intentionalism); Caleb Nelson, What is 
Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 353 (2005)). 
333. Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3, 35 (2006). 
334. Manning, supra note 14, at 96. 
335. See, e.g., PAUL, supra note 5, at 90 (Economic substance and business purpose doctrines 
are too often maxims that ―have little displacement, and usually mean little more than what is desired 
for the occasion.‖). 
336. Indeed, Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak in their proposal that would disallow 
noneconomic losses would permit some noneconomic losses to be deductible, noting that ―Congress 
would not want to disallow every type of noneconomic loss, and that some mechanism is needed to 
separate the deductible wheat from the nondeductible chaff.‖  Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 
1955. 
337. MacNiven v. Westmoreland Invs. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 29 (UKHC).  
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textualists may not rely solely on the text, applying it out of context or 
contrary to the purpose for which a particular tax statute was enacted.  Nor 
may the purposivists indiscriminately fire policies like business purpose or 
economic substance to overturn the otherwise plain meaning of texts.  The 
MacNiven doctrine recognizes that tax definitions are unique to the Code and 
that there is no economic substance apart from the legal definition the Code 
places on these definitions.  When we say something lacks a business purpose 
or lacks economic substance, what we are saying is that the purpose or 
substance behind the action is not that which was contemplated by the statute.  
Therefore, we should focus on the purpose for which the statute was enacted, 
focusing primarily on the language Congress used. 
338
 
Many have decried the rise of textualism in tax advice and lay the blame 
for the increase in shelter activity at the feet of the textualists.
339
  I fully 
recognize that rejecting a broad application of the economic substance and 
business purpose doctrines will likely be ill-received.  However, in my view, 
the problem with the strain of textualism that has given rise to tax shelters is 
not that these lawyers focused too much on the text.  Rather, the problem lies 
in the fact that they applied the text out of context and inconsistent with the 
 
338. Focusing on both the text of the statute and the purposes for which that provision was 
enacted is important not only for properly interpreting the tax laws but also for promoting 
compliance with and respect for the law.  Freedman, supra note 43, at 346.  Taxpayers often enter 
into transactions structured in a way to maximize tax benefits because they have been advised by 
accountants to structure them in that manner.
 
 Some taxpayers do not truly need structures like S 
corporations for their business operations, but they have been advised that this is the way to set up a 
business in a tax-efficient way.  And if they find the advice odd, they simply believe this is one of the 
mysterious things about the way the tax system works.  If taxpayers are then told that they cannot 
structure a transaction in a certain way because it was done solely for tax purposes, they are left more 
than a little perplexed.  As Professor Freedman asks: 
 
What message are such people being given by the tax system? Are they to think 
of tax in terms of economic reality, fairness and rationality when it at first 
appears that incorporation will legitimately save tax and they then find that 
some of those benefits have been negated in a complex way that will probably 
cost them considerable amounts in professional fees? The law has real 
substance here because it has consequences in terms of rights and obligations. . . 
. Right from the start he has been given a signal that it is necessary to take 
account of taxation when making commercial decisions and that the rules can 
change. The culture of artificiality is established and so it continues. . . . In the 
light of this, it is not surprising that business owners will soon come to believe 
that it is perfectly natural to do artificial things for tax purposes and that this 
impression permeates right up the scale to large companies whose directors, 
used to tax impacting on all their decisions, consider it fair game to take tax into 
consideration in all planning and then to go on to undertake tax driven activities. 
Id. at 344–45.  One of the reasons for attacking tax shelters is that it breeds cynicism toward the tax 
system.  But the ad hoc use of maxims like business purpose does the same thing.  
339. See Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 4; Galle, supra note 1, at 359–60; Weisbach, 
supra note 6, at 222. 
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true purpose of the statute.  The gamesmanship engendered by the realistic 
possibility of success and the more likely than not standards only adds to 
these problems. 
In addition, as Professor David A. Weisbach has noted, the use of 
purposivist doctrines like economic substance and business purpose have 
made shelters more exotic and complicated.
340
  The basis of these doctrines is 
that transactions undertaken solely for tax purposes are disallowed.  The 
doctrines thus create the incentive to put just enough window dressing—some 
business activity, some element of risk—to pass the business purpose or 
economic substance test.
341
  By encouraging the addition of layers of entities 
and transactions, these doctrines have had the perverse effect of making 
modern shelters more complicated and therefore more difficult to detect.  The 
solution is to return advisors to the text, not to further divorce them from it.  
Fidelity to the statute simply is not the cause of shelters. 
Moreover, in many instances, the creation and promotion of tax shelters 
was the result of out-and-out fraud and was not the result of a misreading or 
misapplication of complex doctrines.  Just as Professors Chirelstein and 
Zelenak‘s proposal would distinguish between traditional tax planning and 
planning that generates abusive tax shelters,
342
 policy makers must distinguish 
between aggressive tax planning and criminal tax fraud.  We must recognize 
that neither a silver bullet nor a broad-spectrum antibiotic
343
 will stop truly 
fraudulent and abusive shelters.  We should leave the eradication of these 
types of shelters to law enforcement and develop a standard that will 
encourage legitimate tax advice and discourage tax advice that amounts to 
little more than game-playing. 
C.  Using the MacNiven Analysis as a Return Advice Standard 
While the standard set forth in MacNiven is designed to be used by courts 
in statutory construction, its principles can also provide guidance to lawyers in 
advising clients.  Like courts in the analysis of completed transactions, tax 
advisors should apply a ―purposive textualist‖ approach to the Code.  This 
requires lawyers to give a purposive construction to the statute to determine 
the nature of the transaction to which it was intended to apply and then to 
decide whether the actual transaction (which might involve considering the 
overall effect of a number of elements intended to operate together) is 
consistent with the statutory description.  This means that the question is 
 
340. Weisbach, supra note 6, at 237. 
341. Id. at 237–38. 
342. Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1953–54. 
343. Id. at 1951. 
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always whether the language and purpose of the statute apply to the facts of 
the transaction.
344
 
In employing a purposive construction to the Code, a tax lawyer must 
look at the purpose for which the statute was enacted and attempt to apply the 
statute consistently with its true nature and purpose.  The primary focus 
should always be the text of the statute.  In most circumstances, the lawyer 
will examine only the single Code provision at issue, while at other times, the 
entire Code, and not just one provision in isolation, must be examined.  If 
relevant, the lawyer should also consult court opinions and legislative 
history.
345
 
Accordingly, a correct and fair reading of the text itself, or ―the right 
answer‖ if you will, should be the foundation of the standard.  While this 
purposive textualism standard can be formulated in a number of ways, my 
standard is as follows: 
 
A tax professional may advise a client to take a position if, 
based on a good-faith and sound construction of the 
applicable statutory provision, the position is consistent with 
the statute and congressional intent. 
 
The phrase ―sound construction of the applicable statutory provision‖ is 
taken from the ABA Tax Section‘s Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion 
314,
346
 while the phrase ―consistent with the statute and congressional intent‖ 
is taken from the principal purpose definition of the covered opinion rules.
347
  
This straightforward formulation, based not on chances of success but on the 
text itself, will hopefully return tax advice to its original premise for which the 
reliance defense was enacted.
348
  The standard would require an advisor to 
 
344. MacNiven v. Westmoreland Invs. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 8 (UKHC) 
(Nicholls of Birkenhead, L.J.). 
345. Paul, supra note 34, at 417 (―The tax adviser must accept interstitial judicial legislation as 
one of the realities of life.  Legislative words are not inert, but derive vitality from the obvious 
purpose at which they are aimed.‖). 
346. The proposed revisions in turn borrowed this language from Proposed Treasury 
Regulation § 1.6661–3(b)(3), 48 Fed. Reg. 10,862 (Mar. 15, 1983).  Falk, supra note 18, at 656–57.  
Unfortunately, for tax administration, the proposed revisions were not adopted by the ABA Rules 
Committee, which elected to espouse the realistic possibility of success standard.  Id. 
347. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(10) (2007).  The standard is also consistent with the portion 
proposed regulations under § 6694 where a more likely than not conclusion cannot be reached 
because of insufficient authorities:  The proposed regulations provide that a ―tax return preparer may 
reasonably believe that a position more likely than not would be sustained on its merits despite the 
absence of other types of authority if the position is supported by a well-reasoned construction of the 
applicable statutory provision.‖  Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694–2(b)(1), 73 Fed. Reg. 34,560, 34,574 
(June 17, 2008) (emphasis added). 
348. See supra text accompanying notes 60–75. 
2008] “PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM” AND TAX SHELTERS 87 
employ a sound construction of the statute, which, if employed in good faith, 
would reduce tax shelter advice.  If the advisor, in good faith, believes a 
position is consistent with the statute and congressional intent, that should be 
sufficient for the advice to be given.  If taxpayers reasonably rely on the 
advice of competent advisors, then they can sign their returns under penalty of 
perjury believing them to be true, correct, and complete.  If there is substantial 
authority for the position, taxpayers need not disclose their position under § 
6662(d).
349
  Likewise, if substantial authority does not exist, but an advisor 
nevertheless believes the position meets the standard, an advisor may advise 
the taxpayer to take the position without disclosing it.
350
 
Will this standard put an end to tax shelters?  Clearly not.  The desire by 
lawyers and accountants to make money and please clients will always create 
pressures to take aggressive positions on tax returns.
351
  However, as I hope I 
have shown, those pressures are exacerbated by a system (now, more than 
forty years old) that encourages taxpayers and their advisors to push the 
envelope of statutory interpretation.  My modest proposal amounts to this: If 
we change the question from ―what can I get away with?‖ to ―what is the right 
answer?‖ we might get a better answer. 
A good-faith belief would require a tax advisor to examine the entire 
Code, legislative history, the Treasury‘s position in regulations and other 
written guidance, as well as court cases.  Nevertheless, an advisor still could 
give good-faith advice on a position in the face of court cases and Treasury 
regulations to the contrary, if the advisor believes the position represents a 
sound construction of the statute and is consistent with the purpose of the 
statute.
352
 
D.  Applying the Standard 
The proposed standard would be consistent with the way in which many 
tax advisors operate currently, and it would be consistent with much of the 
advice already being given.  Many advisors are already attempting to ascertain 
the ―right answer,‖ and many clients just want to know what the tax law 
requires.  The standard is more important in cases where the client wishes to 
be more aggressive.  There will, of course, be cases in which reasonable 
minds will differ as to whether a position represents a good-faith and sound 
 
349. 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
350. This was the position of the committee that sought the revisions to ABA Formal Opinion 
314.  Matthew C. Ames, Formal Opinion 352: Professional Integrity and the Tax Audit Lottery, 1 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 421 (1987). 
351. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 121, at 1577–78. 
352. Professional responsibility dictates would require the lawyer, however, to inform his or 
her clients that they could be subject to penalties for taking a position contrary to established 
precedent.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6662(d) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
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construction of the applicable statutory provision that is consistent with the 
statute and congressional intent.  In order to examine the outer limits of the 
proposed standard, I will analyze the standard in the context of two notable, 
perhaps notorious, cases: Gitlitz v. Commissioner
353
 and ACM Partnership v. 
Commissioner.
354
 
1.  Gitlitz v. Commissioner 
In Gitlitz, the taxpayers were shareholders of an S corporation that had a 
large amount of losses that could not be deducted because the shareholders 
had insufficient basis in their stock (so-called ―suspended losses‖).355  The 
corporation received cancellation of indebtedness income (―COD income‖), 
which, because the corporation was insolvent at the time of the discharge, was 
not subject to tax.
356
  The issue was whether the COD income was an ―item of 
income‖ subject to pass-through under § 1366(a)(1)(A), which the 
shareholders could then use to increase their basis in the corporation‘s stock, 
thereby freeing up the suspended losses.
357
  The Supreme Court held that the 
COD income was an item of income and allowed the increase in basis.
358
  
Many have argued the Supreme Court‘s decision was incorrect.359  However, 
does the taxpayer‘s position represent a good-faith and sound construction of 
the applicable statutory provision, and is the position consistent with the 
statute and congressional intent? 
The position of whether COD income was an ―item of income‖ for 
purposes of § 1366 certainly had clear support in the statute and regulations.  
Section 1366(a)(1) defined the term ―items of income,‖ to include ―tax-
exempt‖ income,360 and Title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations § 1.1367–
1(d)(2) provided: ―[A basis] adjustment for a nontaxable item is determined 
for the taxable year in which the item would have been includible or 
 
353. 531 U.S. 206 (2001). 
354. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998). 
355. 26 U.S.C. § 1366(d) (2000); Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 210.  Losses at the S corporation level 
flow through to the shareholders of the corporation and reduce the shareholders‘ basis in their stock.  
Losses in excess of basis are suspended until the shareholders increase their basis, thereby freeing up 
the suspended losses. 
356. 26 U.S.C. § 108(a) (2000); Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 210. 
357. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212. 
358. Id. at 218–19. 
359. See, e.g., Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., What Were They Thinking? BB&T Versus Gitlitz, 120 
TAX NOTES 793, 864–65 (2008); Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 1, at 17–20. 
360. 26 U.S.C. § 1366(a)(1) (2000). The government chose instead to litigate the issue in the 
face of the plain meaning of the statute and regulations.  Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212.  While it is true that 
the Treasury adopted new regulations tightening the definition of ―tax-exempt income,‖ those 
regulations were adopted during the course of the litigation of Gitlitz and the other cases, and the 
regulations proposed read curiously like the government‘s briefs filed with the courts in those cases. 
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deductible under the corporation‘s method of accounting for Federal income 
tax purposes if the item had been subject to Federal income taxation.‖361  
Hence, the Code and regulations appeared to contemplate basis increases for 
tax-exempt or nontaxable items, and the taxpayer‘s position thus was at least 
arguably a sound reading of the Code provisions at issue.
362
  There was 
certainly no obvious reading to the contrary,
363
 and the result was consistent 
with the congressional purpose of the statute to provide tax-free treatment to 
discharges of indebtedness and to allow increases in basis for all items of 
income, including tax-exempt income.
364
  Even if one were to look outside the 
language and purpose of the statutes, there was also no general purpose in the 
Code preventing the result obtained—the lone dissenter in the Supreme Court 
was left to resort to ―Congress‘s likely intent‖ that ambiguous statutes should 
be read as ―closing, not maintaining, tax loopholes.‖365  Thus, while one may 
disagree on a policy basis with the decision of the Court in Gitlitz,
366
 the 
position was one that had strong support in the statute and regulations.
367
 
Moreover, I submit that this is the type of issue for which tax advisors 
should be able to give positive advice.  First, the transactions were not entered 
into to obtain the tax benefit, but were the result of real discharges of 
indebtedness between unrelated parties.
368
  Thus, the taxpayers did not order 
their affairs to obtain a certain result or create a transaction out of whole cloth, 
but merely took advantage of the tax law (―exploited the loophole‖) to get the 
 
361. Treas. Reg. § 1.1367-1(d)(2) (2007) (emphasis added). 
362. Full disclosure: I was a member of the law firm, Chicoine & Hallett, that represented the 
taxpayers in Gitlitz from the Tax Court through the Supreme Court.  I therefore cannot claim to be 
completely objective about the decision issued by the Supreme Court. 
363. Indeed, the government took one position in the Tax Court, Nelson v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 
114, 115 (1998), another position in the United States Court of Appeals for the
 
Tenth Circuit, Gitlitz 
v. Comm’r, 182 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 1999), and yet another position in the Supreme Court, 
Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 212 n.5.  The Tax Court based its decision on one interpretation of the Code, 
which the government did not defend on appeal, while the Tenth Circuit‘s decision was grounded on 
different reasoning, which the government, again, did not defend in the Supreme Court.  See Gitlitz, 
531 U.S. at 212 n.5; Gitlitz, 182 F.3d at 1148; Nelson, 110 T.C. at 115.  This game of legal whack-a-
mole belies any contention that the law ―clearly‖ disallowed the claimed increase in basis.  
364. It is safe to say that Congress did not contemplate this issue one way or another. 
365. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 223 (Breyer, J. dissenting).  Justice Breyer cited no authority for 
whence this congressional intent was obtained.  However, Justice Breyer did cite legislative history 
that purported to support the IRS‘s position.  Id. at 221 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 624–25 
(1993), reprinted in  1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 855–56).  However, the House Report cited dealt with 
elections by taxpayers to exclude from gross income the discharge of qualified real property business 
indebtedness.  H.R. REP. NO. 103-111 at 624–25.  The House Report did not purport to provide a 
general explanation regarding the workings of § 108 in the context of S corporations. 
366. See, e.g., Witzel v. Comm‘r, 200 F.3d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 2000) (―It is hard to understand 
the rationale for using a tax exemption to avoid taxation not only on the income covered by the 
exemption but also on unrelated income that is not tax exempt.‖). 
367. For a contrary view, see Cummings, supra note 359, at 865. 
368. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 209. 
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most favorable tax treatment for their genuine transaction.  Second, Gitlitz is 
one of the rare circumstances where the plain meaning of the statute created a 
result that was probably not intended by Congress, but there was no language 
extant in the Code, regulations, or legislative history from which that intent 
could be divined.  Indeed, Professor Eustice warned Congress and the 
Treasury years before the Gitlitz litigation that the plain reading of the Code 
and regulations required the result ultimately reached by the Court.
369
  
Congress ultimately changed the law,
370
 thereby showing its intent (or at least 
the intent of that Congress).  Accordingly, while I generally disagree with the 
notion that encouraging aggressive tax return positions creates a better Code, 
Gitlitz might well be one case in which well-advised, risk-tolerant taxpayers 
did improve the Code.  Regardless, a tax advisor could, prior to the 
amendment of § 108, advise a client in good faith that COD income is an item 
of income that increases the basis in S corporation stock. 
2.  ACM Partnership v. Commissioner 
In ACM Partnership, the taxpayer, Colgate, entered into a series of 
transactions to take advantage of the contingent installment sales 
regulations.
371
  A contingent installment sale is ―a sale or other disposition of 
property in which the aggregate selling price cannot be determined by the 
close of the taxable year in which such sale or other disposition occurs.‖372  
Where the total sales price is contingent on some future event, but the sales 
agreement provides a specific period over which payments may be received, 
the temporary regulations generally require the taxpayer to allocate a portion 
of its basis pro rata over each of the taxable years in which payments are to be 
received.
373
  The taxpayer‘s income for each year from a contingent 
installment sale is therefore the excess of the payments received in that year 
over the pro rata portion of the basis allocated to that year.
374
 
The transaction entered into by Colgate was very convoluted and had 
numerous steps and players.
375
  Reduced to its simplest terms, Colgate entered 
into a partnership with Merrill Lynch and an offshore bank not subject to U.S. 
 
369. James S. Eustice, Financially Distressed S Corporations, 53 TAX NOTES 97 (1991). 
370. Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 402, 116 Stat. 
21 (2002). 
371. 157 F.3d 231, 235–36 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
372. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c) (2007). 
373. Id. § 15a.453-1(c)(3). 
374. See id. 
375. See ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 233–38.  For an excellent explanation of the transaction, see 
Chirelstein & Zelenak, supra note 1, at 1943–45.  Similar transactions were entered into by the 
taxpayers in Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, 273 F.3d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2001); ASA Investments 
Partnership v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505, 508–11 (D.C. Cir. 2000); and others. 
2008] “PURPOSIVE TEXTUALISM” AND TAX SHELTERS 91 
tax.
376
  The bank held an eighty percent interest in the partnership, Colgate 
held a nineteen percent interest, and Merrill Lynch held a one percent 
interest.
377
  Each of the parties contributed cash, totaling $175 million, and in 
year one, the partnership bought and sold various securities.
378
  Ultimately, 
but still in year one, the partnership sold $175 million in Citicorp notes and 
received in return cash (equal to the cash contributed by the offshore bank) 
and new notes, which were to be paid quarterly over a five-year period, and 
which had an interest rate that varied each quarter depending upon the London 
Interbank Offering Rate (LIBOR) interest rate.
379
  Since the amount of the 
payments were to vary each year, the transaction was subject (or so the 
taxpayer hoped) to the contingent installment sales rules.
380
  As a result, the 
$175 million basis was required to be recovered ratably over the next five 
years.
381
 
In year one, under the contingent installment sales rules, the partnership 
used twenty percent of the basis to offset the payments received, which 
generated a large gain, eighty percent of which was allocated to the offshore 
bank.
382
  The bank, of course, did not mind the large amount of gain attributed 
to it because it was not subject to tax in the United States.
383
  The bank‘s 
interest in the partnership was then liquidated, and it received back all of the 
cash it had contributed.
384
  This left Colgate with a ninety-nine percent interest 
in the partnership and Merrill Lynch with a one percent interest.
385
 
In year two, the partnership sold the LIBOR notes.
386
  Under the 
contingent installment sales rules, since the contingent sales contract was now 
to be closed, the partnership could offset its entire remaining basis against the 
amount realized on the sale.
387
  Not surprisingly, this resulted in a large loss to 
the partnership, and ninety-nine percent of the loss was allocated to 
Colgate.
388
  When the dust settled from these transactions, the offshore bank 
had a $90 million gain, which again was not subject to U.S. tax, and Colgate 
 
376. See ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 235. 
377. Id. at 240. 
378. Id. 
379. ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, 42 (1997). 
380. ACM P’ship, 157 F.3d at 240. 
381. Id. 
382. Id. at 250. 
383. Id. at 242. 
384. Id. 
385. Id. at 244. 
386. Id. at 242. 
387. Id. at 252. 
388. Id. at 252 n.40. 
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had a $90 million loss, which of course could be used to offset its U.S. tax 
liability.
389
 
While extraordinarily clever, does this transaction reflect a good-faith and 
sound construction of the applicable statutory provision, and is the position 
consistent with the statute and congressional intent?  In my view it is not, and 
thus, under the proposed standard a tax advisor could not give a positive 
opinion on this transaction.  An entire article could be devoted to dissecting 
this transaction, and I cannot do it justice here.  While the transaction could be 
attacked on other grounds, at bottom, this transaction fails for the same reason 
Judge Hand disallowed tax-free treatment to Ms. Gregory‘s proposed 
reorganization: the installment sale of the notes was not within the purpose of 
the statutory definition of a ―sale.‖390  The term ―sale‖ contemplates a bona 
fide disposition of property between unrelated parties.  A pre-arranged series 
of transactions designed to create a tax loss are not the sort of business 
transactions contemplated by the terms ―sale‖ or ―installment sale.‖391  As the 
Tax Court found, the LIBOR note transaction was a mere artifice designed to 
create a tax loss: 
 
Each of the steps in the section 453 investment strategy was 
planned and arrangements commenced considerably in 
advance of execution.  Before the negotiations to form ACM, 
Merrill had already begun negotiations to purchase the 
Citicorp Notes. Before their purchase, Merrill was negotiating 
for their disposition. By the time ACM acquired the LIBOR 
Notes, Merrill was arranging with Sparekassen the terms on 
which some of them would be sold. The contingent payment 
sale was scheduled to take place before the end of ACM‘s 
first taxable year in order to permit the partnership to spread 
its tax basis in the Citicorp Notes over 6 years instead of 5. 
The distribution and sale of the BFCE Notes was scheduled to 
 
389. ACM P‘ship v. Comm‘r, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) 1, at 83. 
390. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934). 
 
The purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged in enterprises—
industrial, commercial, financial, or any other—might wish to consolidate, or 
divide, to add to, or subtract from, their holdings.   Such transactions were not 
to be considered as ―realizing‖ any profit, because the collective interests still 
remained in solution.   But the underlying presupposition is plain that the 
readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the 
venture in hand, not as an ephemeral incident, egregious to its prosecution. 
Id. 
391. See Comm‘r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) (―To permit the true nature 
of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would 
seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress.‖). 
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occur before the end of Colgate‘s 1989 taxable year in order 
to offset Southampton‘s share of the contingent payment sale 
gain on Colgate‘s consolidated return. It was the 
understanding of the principals that Kannex would retire from 
the partnership by the fall of 1991 so that the LIBOR Notes 
could be sold in time for Colgate to carry back the taxable 
loss to its 1988 taxable year. No supervening market forces or 
other nontax considerations disrupted the scheduled execution 
of these steps.
392
 
 
Therefore, the transaction was not a genuine sale in the sense contemplated by 
the statute and thus was not consistent with the language of the statute or 
intent of Congress when it enacted the provision.
393
 
The obvious criticism of this conclusion is that it is really no different 
from the court‘s determination in ACM Partnership that the transaction lacked 
economic substance.  Admittedly, in many respects, the factors and the 
analysis are the same.  Both the proposed standard and the economic 
substance look at the nature of the transaction and not whether the transaction 
superficially satisfied the language of the statute.  And there is a certain ―I 
know it when I see it‖ aspect to the conclusion that a pre-ordained set of 
transactions between accommodating parties is not a true sale.  But the crucial 
distinction is that the proposed standard does not look outside the language 
and the purpose of the statute at issue to find the answer, while employing the 
economic substance doctrine requires the use of ―an overriding legal 
principle, superimposed upon the whole of revenue law without regard to the 
language or purpose of any particular provision.‖394 
As I hope I have shown, the selective invocation of the economic 
substance and business purpose doctrines is problematic.  What the analysis of 
the ACM Partnership transaction does show is that a standard that focuses on 
the text and the purposes of the statute can be used to limit shelters and other 
 
392. ACM P’ship, 115 T.C.M. (CCH) at 139–41.  The court cited the IRS‘s expert witness, who 
testified that: 
 
[T]he transactions and the returns were the result of a carefully crafted and 
faithfully executed sequence of sophisticated and costly financial maneuvers 
that left little to chance or market opportunities. The score for the Partnership‘s 
actions was very detailed and the libretto even included the writing of the 
minutes of the Partnership meetings weeks before those meetings occurred. 
Id. at 140 n.26. 
393. Compare a Subchapter S election, which admittedly is only done to avoid corporate-level 
taxes.  However, making such an election to avoid taxes is clearly contemplated within the language 
and purpose of the statute. 
394. MacNiven v. Westmoreland Invs. Ltd. [2001] UKHL 6, [2003] 1 A.C. 311, ¶ 29 (UKHC).  
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abusive transactions.  The proposed standard was not designed to deal 
specifically with tax shelters, but was intended as a standard of broad 
application that would encourage legitimate tax advice.  If we can base the 
standard on the language and purpose of the statute and still restrain shelters, 
the debate has, in my view, moved in the right direction. 
E.  The Role of the Bar 
If the current bottling of the tax shelter brine has taught us anything it is 
that the IRS cannot solve the shelter problem without the help of the bar and 
tax professionals in general.  Professor Eustice noted the efficacy of enlisting 
the tax bar,
395
 and others have noted the bar‘s key role in these matters.396  The 
enforcement budget is insufficient for the government to ever fully win the tax 
shelter war.
397
  The bar must therefore recognize its role as both the cause of 
the problem and as part of the solution.
398
  The tax shelter boom and related 
problems could not have occurred without lawyers and accountants.
399
  Thus, 
if tax professionals and taxpayers are stymied by the government‘s actions in 
this area, we have ourselves primarily to blame. 
The tax bar can, of course, adhere to its position that the filing of a tax 
return is the first step in an adversary proceeding and that tax lawyers may 
advocate any position that has just a realistic possibility of succeeding.
400
  But 
if we do so, we must follow the lead of Mark Johnson and ask ourselves: ―Are 
we sentimentally defending an outworn morality with anachronistic 
shibboleths?  Or, worse, are we cynically defending a code of convenience as 
 
395. Eustice, supra note 130, at 164. 
396. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 8, at 369. 
397. I am not as sanguine about this as Pamela Olson, who stated, ―The tax shelter war is over.  
The government won.‖  Pamela F. Olson, Now That You’ve Caught the Bus, What Are You Going to 
Do With It?  Observations from the Frontlines, the Sidelines, and Between the Lines, So to Speak, 60 
TAX LAW. 567, 567 (2007). 
398. Matthew Ames noted: 
 
Changing the ethics of tax advisors and return preparers is such a collateral 
method [of altering taxpayer ethics]; the less willing a tax advisor is to go along 
with a scheme, the less likely the client is to embark on it.  ―[T]he tax 
practitioner plays a dominant and most responsible role.  His attitude becomes 
the attitude of his clients, his basic honesty becomes their standard of 
comparison, his sense of morality becomes a guide to them, for they feel that 
others are abiding by the same high or low standard.‖ 
Ames, supra note 350, at 411 (quoting Merle H. Miller, Morality in Tax Planning, 10 N.Y.U. ANN. 
INST. ON FED. TAX‘N 1067, 1083 (1952)). 
399. Ames, supra note 350, at 426 (―For a supposedly self-regulating profession to wash its 
hands of a problem of which it is an intimate part is shameful.‖). 
400. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). 
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the product of sacred professional obligations?‖401  The bar must also 
recognize that there is no guarantee that the reliance on the advice of a 
professional as a defense to tax penalties will or should continue.  And 
without the reliance defense, taxpayers will be less likely to obtain—and pay 
for—the advice of lawyers and accountants.  Professor Weisbach has 
convincingly argued that there is nothing immutable about the current system 
of penalties and the reliance defense.
402
  Indeed, Congress has already enacted 
one penalty (§ 6707A)
403
 and proposed another (as part of the codification of 
the economic substance doctrine)
404
 for which reliance on the advice of a 
professional is not a defense.  Moreover, other areas of the law, including 
environmental law and securities law, do not permit people to avoid civil 
penalties by relying on the advice of counsel.  Thus, tax advisors must 
recognize their central role as gatekeepers and their duty to the system,
405
 if 
not for the sake of the system, then at least for the sake of their own 
livelihood.
406
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The government‘s desire to ―do something‖ about the tax shelter problem 
is understandable.  However, in attempting to fix the shelter problem, 
Congress and the Treasury should not make legitimate tax advice and 
legitimate tax planning more difficult.  The tax system is based on voluntary 
compliance, which requires a well-informed and well-advised citizenry.  In 
addition, the rules and standards for tax advice should encourage tax planning 
to be legitimate.  The general standard for tax advice must be understandable 
and straightforward.  Moreover, it must promote advice that hews as close to 
the intent of Congress as possible.  Basing the standard on a true construction 
of the statute, rather than a chance of success, has the greatest chance of 
accomplishing that goal. 
 
401. Johnson, supra note 37, at 25. 
402. Weisbach, supra note 6, at 221. 
403. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6707A (West 2007). 
404. See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelter Shutdown and Taxpayer Accountability Act of 2007, H.R. 
2345, 110th Cong. § 101 (2007). 
405. See, e.g., Darrell, supra note 26, at 131; Schizer, supra note 8, at 370–71. 
406. Ames, supra note 350, at 427. 
 
The current self-assessment system relies on the integrity of taxpayers and 
tax advisors for its success.  It is currently in trouble, at least partly because that 
integrity is lacking.  The profession must at least attempt to mitigate the 
problem by protecting that integrity.  By exercising leadership, lawyers may 
perform a valuable service for themselves and for society.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
